> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND SOUTHERN DIVISION

WISSAM ABDULLATEFF : Civil Action No.
SA'EED AL-QURAISHI, et al., : PJM 08-1696
v. :

ADEL NAKHLA, : Greenbelt, Maryland L-3 SERVICES, INCORPORATED, Defendant.

TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE PETER J. MESSITTE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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## P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Civil Action Number PJM 2008-1696, Wissam Abdullateff Sa'eed Al-Quraish versus Adel Nakhla and L-3 Services, Inc. The matter is before the Court for motions hearing.

THE COURT: All right. Counsel, for plaintiff, identify yourselves please.

MS. BURKE: Susan Burke from the law film of Burke, O'Neil. I'm here with my partner, William O'Neil and with Katherine Gallagher from the Center for Constitutional Rights.

THE COURT: And for the Defendant L-3.
MR. ZYMELMAN: Your Honor, Ari Zymelman from Williams \& Connolly. With me is my partner, Greg Bowman for L-3 Services, Inc.

MR. DELINSKY: And, Your Honor, Eric Delinsky on behalf of Adel Nakhla.

THE COURT: I'd like to, unless you have something preliminary, start with the Motion to Transfer, which obviously is logically the one to talk about before we talk about a Motion to Dismiss. I'll hear from L-3 on that.

MR. BOWMAN: Good morning, Your Honor. Greg Bowman, Williams \& Connolly, LLC on behalf of Defendant L-3 Services, Inc. Your Honor, we've prepared binders with key cases.

THE COURT: All right. Hand those up, sure.
All right.

MR. BOWMAN: Your Honor, I'd like to reserve ten minutes of my time to respond to counsel's argument. L-3's Motion to Transfer is straightforward. It is clear that this case should be transferred to the Eastern District of Virginia. THE COURT: Let me just ask, Nakhla is joining this motion or do you have a separate argument to make for Nakhla on the Motion to Transfer?

MR. DELINSKY: No separate argument, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right, very good.

MR. BOWMAN: There's two independent reasons, Your Honor, that justify transferring this case to the Eastern District. First is a related case pending in that jurisdiction in the same procedural posture as this case, or at least after today. Motions to Dismiss in the Eastern District case have been argued, briefed and argued and pending decision.

THE COURT: Sorry, Summary Judgment Motions.
MR. BOWMAN: Motion to Dismiss.
THE COURT: Motion to Dismiss.
MR. BOWMAN: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. BOWMAN: There was also a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Statute of Limitations that was denied. THE COURT: Now, tell me how many plaintiffs and name your plaintiffs and defendants in your Virginia litigation. MR. BOWMAN: Your Honor, There are four plaintiffs in
the Virginia litigation.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. BOWMAN: There are -- there's a corporate, a set of corporate defendants, CACI. There are no individual defendants, natural persons in that case.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BOWMAN: In this case there are 72 plaintiffs and one corporate defendant, L-3 Services, Inc., one individual defendant, Adel Nakhla.

THE COURT: All right. And no question that Nakhla resides in Maryland?

MR. BOWMAN: That's correct, Your Honor.
So again, two independent reasons. One is to transfer for consolidation in coordination with the related case in the Eastern District. That case is Al-Shimari, S-H-I-M-A-R-I.

The second reason is that the center of gravity of this case is in fact in the Eastern District of Virginia, and that is an independent basis for transferring this case there. It's also notable that there are no factors weighing against transfer. In this particular case, the plaintiff's choice of venue is entitled to little or no weight for three reasons.

First, because the plaintiffs have not filed in any of their home jurisdictions. Secondly, there's no connection --

THE COURT: What are their home jurisdictions?
They're aliens, aren't they?

MR. BOWMAN: They're all Iraqi citizens, Your Honor. THE COURT: They're what?

MR. BOWMAN: Iraqi citizens.
THE COURT: What's their home jurisdiction for federal jurisdiction purposes?

MR. BOWMAN: They have none within the United States, Your Honor.

THE COURT: They can file anywhere, can't they? MR. BOWMAN: They can.

THE COURT: Okay. So why are you saying it's entitled to no weight? I'm not sure I follow that argument.

MR. BOWMAN: The basis for giving a plaintiff deference when he files in his home jurisdiction is there's a presumption that that's the most convenient jurisdiction for that party to litigate, because that party is located there. That is not the case here.

THE COURT: Do you have a case that stands for that proposition that you're not to give any weight to the selection of a forum by an alien?

MR. BOWMAN: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: What's that case?
MR. BOWMAN: In fact we have a number of authorities.
In this Court's decision in Dicken which is in fact in the binder that I provided. That case in fact involved a plaintiff filing in its home jurisdiction, but with the -- with this
jurisdiction and that case had little connection to the events at issue, and this Court held plaintiff's forum was entitled to little weight.

In the Lycos, $\mathrm{L}-\mathrm{Y}-\mathrm{C}-\mathrm{O}-\mathrm{S}$, matter which is also in the binder, the plaintiff filed in the jurisdiction that was not its home forum and the Court held slight weight --

THE COURT: I think I asked a slightly different question. Do you have a case that says that choice by a foreign, by an alien is not given particular weight because he or she has no nexus with any particular jurisdiction? I understand that there are cases where weight is not given to a plaintiff's choice, but I was asking a more specific question. MR. BOWMAN: The third case I was getting to, Your Honor, Mamani, which is also in the binder. It's also a decision of this Court, involved alien plaintiffs. And the Court held that the deference was significantly lessened where such alien plaintiffs filed in a foreign jurisdiction.

And again, I -- in using the terms alien and foreign in this context, it's not that the plaintiffs come from outside this country. It's that the same would apply to a plaintiff with a home jurisdiction within the United States, but not within Maryland.

The fourth case I point Your Honor to is the Polaroid case. And there the Court said that plaintiff's choice of venue was entitled to no weight due to an inference that forum
shopping had occurred.
THE COURT: Well, seems to me there's been a lot of forum shopping on both sides of this case. Defendants have done a lot of moving of these cases around the country if I'm not mistaken.

MR. BOWMAN: Your Honor, There have been four cases all transferred to the Eastern District of Virginia by defendants. The Eastern District of Virginia is the only jurisdiction in this country that all these cases can be heard regardless of the composition of the defendants; i.e., the mix of individual and corporate defendants.

THE COURT: Well, but there's been some re-alignment of parties. Haven't certain parties been dropped? I mean, CACI is not in the case anymore.

MR. BOWMAN: The plaintiffs have re-aligned the cases and dismissed some cases or defendant's in order to try to re-align the cases such that two are proceeding at the same time in two different jurisdictions, which is one of the main inefficiencies that Section $1404(\mathrm{a})$ is designed to prevent. And this forms the basis, one of the basis of our motions.

As I said, there are two independent bases. One being the related case, but the second being that the center of gravity of these cases is in fact in the Eastern District of Virginia. Now, L-3 as the movant has the burden of establishing two elements. First, that the case might have been brought in
the Eastern District. And second, that the transfer is for the convenience of parties and witnesses in the interest of justice. L-3 submits that both, both of these requirements are easily satisfied here. First, the case having brought in Eastern District of Virginia. There are two defendants here. L-3 Services, Inc. and Adel Nakhla. As to L-3 Services, I don't believe there's any dispute that there's personal jurisdiction in the Eastern District of Virginia. That's L-3's headquarters. Headquarters is located in Alexandria within that jurisdiction.

As for Adel Nakhla, L-3 submitted a declaration in support of its motion establishing the facts necessary to show personal jurisdiction within the Eastern District.

In short, Mr. Nakhla undertook purposeful contacts with that jurisdiction in the course of obtaining employment with $\mathrm{L}-3$, which of course is the only reason that he was in Iraq and implicated in the instant action.

In response, plaintiffs argue that L-3 failed to meet its burden of showing personal jurisdiction over Adel Nakhla because Mr. Nakhla obtained dismissal in the action, in a different action pending in the District of Columbia on personal jurisdiction grounds. L-3 submits that, first of all, that the question of personal jurisdiction over Mr. Nakhla in the District of Columbia is irrelevant to the question of personal jurisdiction over him in the Eastern District. Mr. Nakhla's contacts were with the Eastern District, not the District of

Columbia.
Secondly, the plaintiffs in that case as noted in the District Court's decision didn't even seek to invoke the District of Columbia Long Arm Statute. In fact, relied on nationwide service of process available under RICO. And so when the RICO claims fail, there was no jurisdiction over Mr. Nakhla. That has no effect on this Court's determination of personal jurisdiction over Mr. Nakhla in the Eastern District.

Your Honor, I'd like to take you -- you've asked me a few questions already about one of the other cases pending that arises out of the same facts. I'd like to take a few moments, particularly since this is the first time we've appeared before this Court, to walk through the background of the litigation which --

THE COURT: That will be helpful.
MR. BOWMAN: It actually starts, this litigation began back in June of 2004. The first case to be filed out of the allegations arising at Abu Ghraib and other prisons in Iraq was a case that was initially captioned Alrawi, $A-L-R-A-W-I$. It's filed in June, 2004 in the Central District of California. It happened to be the same legal team in that case as in this case before this Court.

THE COURT: Same legal team for plaintiff?
MR. BOWMAN: For the plaintiff, yes, Your Honor.
The defendant -- that case was filed as a class
action, so it purported to include all prisoners at the U.S. Military that may have been abused in Iraq, anywhere in Iraq at any of the U.S. controlled prisons. So, in fact, that action, the putative class in that case would encompass the plaintiffs in this case.

The plaintiffs counsel there was --
THE COURT: Were any of the plaintiffs in this case, though, nominal plaintiffs in the California action?

MR. BOWMAN: None of the plaintiffs named in this case were named in the California action. Plaintiffs' counsels, as I've said, there and here are the same.

The defendants in that case included the Titan Corporation, which is the predecessor to L-3 Services, Inc. Williams \& Connolly also defended the Titan Corporation in that action, and now defends L-3 Services here.

The other set of corporate defendants in that case was CACI, which was defended by Steptoe \& Johnson, the same legal team that's defending CACI in the Eastern District case. So that was the first lawsuit that was filed. About a month later or within a month, a second lawsuit was filed in the District of Columbia. That case --

THE COURT: Same plaintiffs' counsel.
MR. BOWMAN: Different plaintiffs' counsel, same defense counsel to shorthand it. That case, as I said, was filed in the District of Columbia.

THE COURT: What was the title of that case, who was plaintiff?

MR. BOWMAN: That case was Ibrahim, I-B-R-A-H-I-M. THE COURT: All right.

MR. BOWMAN: The two cases -- the California case, as I said, was filed earlier, but ultimately there was a Motion to Transfer.

THE COURT: I'm not sure. Tell me who was suing whom in the District of Columbia.

MR. BOWMAN: Okay. In the District of Columbia there were, and forgive me if $I$-- there's been many amendments to all these cases, but there were a handful of cases initially in that case.

THE COURT: Are any plaintiffs from this case there?
MR. BOWMAN: No, Your Honor, there are no common named plaintiffs.

THE COURT: All right. And who were they suing?
MR. BOWMAN: They were suing, again, the same corporate defendants, L-3's predecessor at the time, Titan and the CACI.

THE COURT: No individual defendants?
MR. BOWMAN: In the Ibrahim case, there were no individual defendants.

THE COURT: All right. And what judge had that case? Was that Judge --

MR. BOWMAN: That's Judge Robertson. It was initially assigned to Judge Robertson.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. BOWMAN: Backing up to the California case, the Saleh case, there were individual defendants in that case. Adel Nakhla was one the individual defendants, and there were also individual defendants who were employees or former employees of CACI. So that the California case was clearly the broadest on both because it was a class action, and because it included corporate and individual defendants.

The CACI defendants filed a Motion to Transfer the Alrawi case, which was later captioned Saleh, S-A-L-E-H, to the Eastern District of Virginia.

THE COURT: Is this while the case was pending in D.C. as well?

MR. BOWMAN: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. BOWMAN: Yes. And in fact, counsel for the Titan Corporation in its papers suggested that the District of Columbia might be a better forum for that very reason, because there was a related case pending in the District of Columbia. THE COURT: Even though the locus of activity was in Virginia, according to your present argument?

MR. BOWMAN: That's correct.
The Titan Corporation joined the motion and did not
object to transfer to Eastern District of Virginia, the locus, but also suggested that the District of Columbia might be appropriate.

THE COURT: Interesting. That's an interesting point. You argue somehow Maryland is not appropriate, not much farther than Virginia, but sobeit. We'll come back to that.

MR. BOWMAN: If they were related cases pending here, that might be different. But the point that we were making at the time was given the related case, given the related case in the District of Columbia, the efficiencies of consolidation might make that --

THE COURT: Who asked for it to be transferred to
Virginia?
MR. BOWMAN: The CACI defendants did.
THE COURT: And what, plaintiffs consented?
MR. BOWMAN: Plaintiffs opposed.
THE COURT: Plaintiffs opposed, okay.
MR. BOWMAN: As Ms. Burke has indicated. Plaintiff's vigorously opposed that transfer.

THE COURT: And which judge had the case is
California?
MS. BURKE: Rhoades.
MR. BOWMAN: Judge Rhoades, thank you.
Judge Rhoades, and his opinion is in fact appended as an exhibit to L-3's Motion to Transfer, so you have that before
you.
THE COURT: Just to follow you for a moment, L-3 was in that case as well is what you said.

MR. BOWMAN: L-3's predecessor, the Titan Corporation. THE COURT: All right.

MR. BOWMAN: So the case was -- in Judge Rhodes' opinion, Judge Rhoades wrote an exhaustive opinion, which has been, sense been cited many, many times in the Ninth Circuit. Did an exhaustive analysis and transferred the case to the Eastern District of Virginia.

Upon arrival in the Eastern District, the plaintiffs in that case moved to re-transfer the case to the District of Columbia. That motion was opposed by the defendants, but ultimately was granted and the case was then transferred to the District of Columbia and consolidated for discovery purposes with the Ibrahim case. And ultimately, Judge Robertson in the District of Columbia presided over both of those cases.

Now, as the cases proceeded along, Judge Robertson granted the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss all the federal claims in both cases. There were -- those claims included Alien Tort Statute claims identical to the ones in this case, and they also included a number of other federal causes of action that are not alleged here.

All those federal claims were dismissed. Some of the state law claims were dismissed on Motions to Dismiss and, but
not all of them were. As to the surviving state law claims, Judge Robertson ordered limited discovery based upon the strength of the defendant's preemption defenses. So Judge Robertson ordered discovery into direction and control of the defendant's employees at the military facilities in Iraq to determine whether state law was in fact preempted as to those defendants.

After taking approximately 20 depositions on a consolidated basis between the two cases, Judge Robertson ultimately issued a judgment for the Titan Corporation, which is L-3 Services' predecessor, but denied the CACI Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact in dispute.

Those cases, Judge Robertson's rulings were all appealed in various appeals, six appeals in all, to the D.C. Circuit and those cases have been fully briefed and they were argued last month. So we're waiting decision from the D.C. Circuit on those cases. That's what we refer to in our briefs as the first round of litigation.

The second round of litigation of which this case is a part was initiated in May of 2008 with the case filed in the Central District of California captured Al-Janabi, J-A-N-A-B-I. Mr. Al-Janabi sued the same two sets of corporate defendants, L-3 Services, Inc. and CACI, along with one of the CACI's employees as an individual defendant.

Subsequently, four additional lawsuits were filed in the second round of cases in four distinct venues around the country, including the Western District of Washington, Southern District of Ohio, Eastern District of Michigan and the District of Maryland.

THE COURT: And these were all where individual
defendants resided, I guess?
MR. BOWMAN: That's correct, Your Honor. Each of the five cases in the so-called second round involved one plaintiff and with one exception, the two corporate defendants, plus one individual defendant who is an employee of one of the two corporations. The exception was the case filed in the Eastern District of Michigan, Al-Taee, which was filed solely against L-3 Services.

What occurred next is that the CACI defendants filed a number of Motions to Transfer, which L-3 Services joined starting with --

THE COURT: Let me stop you though for a minute. At that point, was -- L-3 was or Titan was a defendant in D.C. when all these Motions to Transfer were pending? Is L-3 a defendant anywhere at that point?

MR. BOWMAN: Let's see. The judgment issued to L-3 in D.C. was December of 2007. Notice of Appeal was filed within 30 days thereafter so that L-3's case was on appeal in the D.C. Circuit when this second round of cases was filed.

THE COURT: Okay. And even so, there was a Motion to Transfer to D.C., is that correct?

MR. BOWMAN: No, Your Honor. The Motions to Transfer were to the Eastern District of Virginia.

THE COURT: Oh, Virginia, okay. And why was that as opposed to D.C., just because it was farther along?

MR. BOWMAN: No, sir, because the cases with
individual defendants could not be transferred to D.C. for lack of personal jurisdiction of the individuals, which goes to the point I made earlier. Eastern District is the only jurisdiction in the country which happens to be proper for any of these cases, because of the different residences of the individual defendants that have been involved.

So again, the first, the first Motion to Transfer I believe was filed in the first filed case, which was the Central District of California case, Al-Janabi. That case was -- the Motion to Transfer that was opposed by the plaintiff, the plaintiff in that case, but the Court did in fact rule in favor of the defendants and transferred that case to the Eastern District of Virginia. That opinion is also included in our papers as an exhibit to our papers. Do you have that before you?

In the meantime and I think actually before that decision issued, two of the other five plaintiffs in this first round of cases consented or did not oppose transfer of their
cases into the Eastern District. Those were Al-Ogaidi, O-G-A-I-D-I, in the Western District of Washington, and Al-Shimari, S-H-I-M-A-R-I, in the Southern District of Ohio. So, ultimately, those three cases were transferred by the courts to the Eastern District and all were present there for a short period of time. At that point, the plaintiff, the Al-Ogaidi plaintiff, Mr. Al-Ogaidi and Mr. Al-Janabi filed Rule 41 dismissals and then joined in this case through the mechanism of the First Amended Compliant, which was filed September 5th of 2008.

That left only one case, Al-Shimari in the Eastern District. In that case, Mr. Al-Shimari dismissed L-3 Services, Inc. and the only individual defendant, leaving CACI, the CACI corporate defendants as the sole defendant in the Eastern District. Mr. Al-Janabi, Mr. Al-Ogaidi and ultimately Mr. Al-Taee then joined this case on September 5th, 2008.

That brings us, I think, up to date on the second -THE COURT: So there's only two jurisdictions involved now, Eastern District and this, is that correct?

MR. BOWMAN: Well, now we come to the third round of cases.

THE COURT: You have cases on appeal.
MR. BOWMAN: We have cases on appeal and we have what
I'll call the third round of cases, the first of which was recently filed in the District of Columbia. So we now have a
new case.

THE COURT: Who is that? Who is suing who there?

MR. BOWMAN: The caption is Abbass, $A-B-B-A-S-S$. There are numerous defendants and I'm sorry I don't have the count off the top of my head, but more than 50 I believe.

THE COURT: One plaintiff and --

MR. BOWMAN: I'm sorry, plaintiffs, numerous
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs' counsel in that case is the same
legal team in the Ibrahim case in the District of Columbia, the companion case.

THE COURT: But not these counsel here.

MR. BOWMAN: Not these counsel here.

In that case, the parties have agreed to stay that case pending the outcome of the appeals in the D.C. Circuit.

THE COURT: Because one will fall if the appeal is sustained?

MR. BOWMAN: Well, that's our, that's our argument.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BOWMAN: We've been told by plaintiff's counsel here that there may be additional plaintiffs and cases, but we have not seen any further filings in the so-called third round of cases.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BOWMAN: So coming back to this case -- so I guess to sum up, we have one case pending in the Eastern District of

Virginia. That's Al-Shimari involving now four plaintiffs. Three additional plaintiffs were added to that case subsequently. Now it's four plaintiffs, one set of corporate defendants, the CACI defendants. It's in the same procedural posture that this case will be in after today's hearing.

THE COURT: Well, now, enlighten me again. In D.C., is L-3 a defendant there or not?

MR. BOWMAN: In D.C., L-3 is a defendant in the Abbass case. L-3, L-3 has been given judgment in the other two cases, Ibrahim and Saleh, and that judgment is on appeal in the D.C. Circuit.

THE COURT: Well, is it going to be your argument there's a res judicata issue here if the D.C. Circuit decides favorably to you?

MR. BOWMAN: We have not made that argument, Your Honor. We think that, we think the D.C. Circuit's opinion would certainly be persuasive, but we have not argued that res judicata would apply.

THE COURT: Okay, all right.
MR. BOWMAN: In this case, as I said, there was a First Amended Complaint filed on September 5th and then L-3 Services filed the instant motion. It's the Motion to Transfer to Eastern District on September 8th, 2008. Our motion to --

L-3's Motions to Dismiss were filed later, November 28.

THE COURT: Just to sort of stay with your case,
you've got four plaintiffs and one corporate defendant there, and you've got summary judgment motions -- I'm talking about Eastern District now. Summary judgment motions have been briefed and argued.

MR. BOWMAN: Again, it's the Motion to Dismiss.
THE COURT: I'm sorry, Motions to Dismiss have been briefed and argued.

MR. BOWMAN: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And you're waiting for an opinion. And
who's got that? Is that Judge Lee's case?
MR. BOWMAN: That is Judge Lee's case, yes, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: When was that argued?
MR. BOWMAN: It was argued in, I believe October. I
can get the exact date for you, but I believe it was October.
THE COURT: Any indication of when he's going to issue
an opinion? Never ask a federal judge that, right?
MR. BOWMAN: He hasn't told me, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. BOWMAN: So coming back and I'm sorry for the
fairly lengthy diversion. It's a complicated procedural history. Coming back to the point I was making before we started talking about the procedure. We think for three reasons, plaintiff's choice of venue here is entitled to, at best, little weight. At best for them, little weight, but more
likely no weight at all, for three reasons. One, they have not
$\qquad$
THE COURT: Just on one other fact. Defendant Nakhla is not a defendant anywhere else at this point, is that correct? MR. BOWMAN: That's correct.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. BOWMAN: Again, three reasons why plaintiffs' choice of venue is entitled to little or no weight. They have not filed in their home venue; this venue has no connection to the complaint of conduct. And third, plaintiffs admit in their, in their papers to a collective plan to have two cases going at the same time, to related cases going at the same time and that is an inefficiency that $1404(\mathrm{a})$ is designed to prevent.

And I said, they admit to a -- they use the words "collective plan". They do contest that the cases are, in fact, related in a way that we believe they are. So I'd like to walk the Court through the reasons we believe the cases are sufficiently --

THE COURT: All right, but let's wind up because I want to hear from the other side, and you want to also rebut, so.

MR. BOWMAN: Sure. So very briefly plaintiffs have attempted to paint the Virginia action as focusing exclusively on CACI's acts in the hard site of the Abu Ghraib prison.

First, I'd like to point out that the Virginia case is actually
broader than that. The lead plaintiff, Al-Shimari, alleges in the complaint that he was detained for nearly five years, the same years that are at issue in this complaint. So, Shimari was detained from 2003 to 2008 by the allegations in the complaint. That is in fact the same period that's at issue here.

In addition, Mr. Shimari, the lead plaintiff in the Virginia case, spent only two months of his time at the Abu Ghraib hard site. The balance of that five years was spent at other locations, including Camp Bucca where 14 of the plaintiffs in this case were held. So at any rate, plaintiffs cannot deny that third, important third-party witnesses, the military officials who were present at the Abu Ghraib hard cite at least during that 2003 or 2004 time period are going to be witnesses in the Shimari case, and those same people, those same military officials will be witnesses here. That's undeniable.

There are 52 plaintiffs in this case that were held at Abu Ghraib. Now, there may be 21 other prisons at issue in this case, but 52 of the 72 plaintiffs in this case were held at Abu Ghraib. Thirty-two of them were held during that same time period, 2003 through 2004 at Abu Ghraib. It's just undeniable that these third-party witnesses --

THE COURT: How many plaintiffs in Eastern District were held at Abu Ghraib. MR. BOWMAN: All four of them. THE COURT: All four?

MR. BOWMAN: Right. And perhaps more importantly -THE COURT: Is there a claim limited to the Abu Ghraib alleged mistreatment or --

MR. BOWMAN: Not by my reading of the complaint, Your Honor. Shimari specifically alleges that he was held at Camp Bucca.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. BOWMAN: Perhaps more importantly, plaintiff in both cases, Eastern District and in this case, rely on allegations of a vast conspiracy among, amongst L-3 and it's employees, CACI and it's employees and certain military officials. And they rely on that conspiracy to impute liability to taking this case to L-3 for the actions of, the alleged actions of CACI interrogators. That makes the CACI interrogators witnesses in this case and third party witnesses, which are the most important to consider for the balance of conveniences.

And it also makes L-3's witness, L-3's employees witnesses in the Eastern District case. No question about that. And L-3's witnesses are, in fact, third parties in the Eastern District case and that's weighs heavily in favor of consolidation.

In fact, the plaintiff's counsel in this case has already notified L-3's counsel that it wishes to take third-party discovery from L-3 for the purpose of the Eastern

District case. Now, that didn't happen because discovery in the Eastern District was stayed pending the resolution of the Motions to Dismiss. But before that stay was entered, plaintiff's counsel here notified L-3 that it wished to take third-party discovery from L-3.

The parties in the Eastern District case agreed to 20 non-party depositions. So the scope of that third-party discovery is going be extensive in the Eastern Virginia action, Eastern District action.

THE COURT: I need for you to wind up. I want to hear from plaintiff's counsel.

MR. BOWMAN: I'll wind up here, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right, Ms. Burke.
MS. BURKE: May it please the Court. My name is Susan Burke representing the plaintiffs. Our initial concern with the Motion to Transfer is whether L-3 has carried its burden of proving that the action could have been brought in the Eastern District of Virginia. And this is specifically as to the individual defendant.

We have actually gone through, as you heard from counsel, we've gone through this before where a case has been transferred over our objections and then we lost jurisdiction over the individual, the individual torturer.

Here, the Virginia Long Arm Statute does permit exercise of jurisdiction for anyone transacting any business in
the Commonwealth, and L-3 has put in an affidavit that delineates very narrow contacts where Mr. Nakhla went to Virginia to apply for his job.

THE COURT: Well, what if he stipulates that he will submit jurisdiction?

MS. BURKE: It's actually -- you cannot solve that issue by stipulation. There's case law that says that, you know, the defendants can't simply concede to cure that problem. So what we're worried about is Sub-section C of the Virginia Long Arm Statute that says, when jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only a cause of action arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted against him.

So what we're worried about is that they could, in fact, if it were to be moved to Virginia, that he could successfully assert that our claims against him for rape, for the torture, that those don't arise from his submission of an employment application. So we could end up in a posture where we do not have jurisdiction over Mr. Nakhla.

So for that reason, the burden is on L-3 and we don't think they can meet that burden. But even assuming for the sake of argument that they could, which we don't think they can, they're simply wrong that our choice of forum is entitled to no deference. Even the cases they cite themselves, for example, the Polaroid case, what it says is, a plaintiff is not entitled
to deference if the forum has little or no connection with the parties of the subject matter.

Here, we have a very distinct and clear connection to Maryland. This is where one of the torturers resides. It's his community. This is where he lives. That is, that is a strong reason. We didn't just file this, you know, in the middle of nowhere. We filed it where Nakhla was located. We want to bring these cases, we want to bring cases on the torture in the jurisdictions where the torturers reside. So, the notion that our choice of forum is not entitled to difference is an over-statement and is not supported by the case law that they cite.

The other reasons why you would possibly transfer have to do with convenience to the witnesses. Given the proximity between Virginia and Maryland, that simply is not a strong argument. We certainly confronted and lost on that very issue when we tried to maintain these actions on the West Coast. But here, there is not the same inconvenience. You know, Greenbelt is not that far from Alexandria. So none of those weigh in favor of moving it to Virginia.

Now, although --
THE COURT: What about the duplication of effort; same parties, same issue?

MS. BURKE: Well, Your Honor, originally, we filed back as a class action for just that reason, that there seemed
to be some economies of scale, some efficiencies into treating this all as a class action where you would have common rulings on certain legal issues. The defendants opposed that and they prevailed, so this is not a class action.

So what happened instead in D.C. actually illuminates why there's not going to be the benefit of consolidation. There Robertson had before him both the defendants and he went off in different directions for the two of them. The conduct of $\mathrm{L}-3$ and of Titan is a different genre of conduct from CACI. The other point that they're making about, well, the fact that we have overlapping periods of detention, you know, in the Virginia case and in this case. That misses the point. This is not a case about detention.

So, yes, you know, some of the, some of the Eastern District of Virginia defendants -- plaintiffs, excuse me, were in fact detained, other than at Abu hard site. But the reason that that is a Abu Ghraib hard site case is because that's where they were tortured. So although we pled how long they were kept in detention, that's neither here nor there for the purposes of the trial.

So here what we're looking at is a very narrow Eastern District of Virginia case that is in fact limited to the Abu Ghraib hard site torture. There are certain witnesses that are going to be testifying about that and there's a certain body of evidence that will go in to prove that.

This case is different. We're going to be proving torture at Camp Cropper. We're going to be proving torture at a mobile facility called the Disco. So there is not, there is not, there is not the overlap that --

THE COURT: And also Abu Ghraib though.
MS. BURKE: Well, as a practical matter, we believe that if the Eastern District of Virginia, that that adjudication will likely precede this Court's adjudication because of the pace of that case. And so our expectancy would be that when we are able to get a jury verdict establishing that torture, that we may be able to resolve that by settlement with the defendants, the particular plaintiffs here that are limited to hard site.

But our plaintiffs here are not hard site victims. People were held at Abu and not tortured at Abu. So the fact that we have a plaintiff that was held at Abu Ghraib, he could have been held in the tent camps and the torture did not go on there. So, he could be picked up, put in the tent camps at Abu Ghraib and then transferred to Cropper, and he's tortured at Cropper.

So, it's a location -- it's not the question of where they were detained. The question is where they were tortured. And so that's why in this case we really have -- you know, we have really tried to parse through and we've put the Abu Ghraib hard site torture in Virginia. This case is much broader and
it's going to be about torture at other locations as well. So we don't think that the -- we do not think that there is a need to move the entire thing to Virginia. And as a practical matter, the argument that there's a nexus with Virginia that doesn't exist here is simply wrong. These actions took place in Iraq. So there's not, there's not some Virginia connection to everything that's going to end up being important to the resolution.

So we would ask that this Court keep this case, that permit us to ensure that we have jurisdiction over the individual torturer and permit the case to proceed to trial here. Any inefficiencies are able to be handled by -- we do have counsel we've worked with for many years now and certainly in terms of discovery and the like, any of those types of things can be handled with a case management and status conference type orders.

THE COURT: I guess I want to explore with both counsel the issue of how this would fold into the Virginia case anyway, which has already been argued and briefed. What's the idea, that Motions to Dismiss would simply be transported there and Judge Lee would then consider them in conjunction with the other Motions to Dismiss?

Is that what you have in mind, Mr. Bowman?
MR. BOWMAN: Yes, Your Honor.
MS. BURKE: And, Your Honor, Judge Lee has already
considered and had argument on the issues before him. And as I said, they are different issues. Robertson came out different ways based on the different company. So if this were to be transferred, it would have to be re-briefed.

THE COURT: L-3 or Titan was in the D.C. litigation, was it not? Did I misunderstand?

MS. BURKE: No, they were in D.C., but what I'm saying is Judge Lee has before him only CACI. And the -- and as you can tell from the Robertson order, they have a different role. The interrogation raises different issues than the translation. So Judge Lee, we would have to re-argue, re-brief, and go before Judge Lee in order for there to be a ruling on $\mathrm{L}-3$.

The arguments that went back and forth on CACI simply wouldn't extend to or cover the role played by the L-3 translators. So there would be an inefficiency at the very outset by transferring it to Lee.

THE COURT: All right.
MS. BURKE: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Delinsky, you want to say something? MR. DELINSKY: Your Honor, if I can make three brief points.

THE COURT: All right, go ahead.
MR. DELINSKY: Three issues have come up, Your Honor, which I'd just like to take you through very quickly. Number one, on behalf of Mr. Nakhla we have put in a joinder paper to
this Court in which we state explicitly that Mr. Nakhla is joining in the transfer motion. And we further go on to state that Mr. Nakhla does not and will not contest personal jurisdiction in the Eastern District of Virginia for this case.

I don't believe that we, we'd be legally or ethically able to contest jurisdiction in Virginia, or to file the motion that Ms. Burke is fearful of in the Eastern District of Virginia having put this position in writing to the Court and having re-asserted it here today. We will not contest jurisdiction in the Eastern District and I don't believe that that fear is well-placed.

Secondly, Your Honor, as to the convenience point. Mr. Nakhla is just an individual. He has never been in the military. He has always been a civilian contractor, and at that only for a period of eleven months. Mr. Nakhla has a job, and for him to be deposed twice and to take days off from work not only in this case, but also in the Virginia case, for that reason alone, being a third party to the Virginia case and having to go through that deposition twice, would pose a significant inconvenience.

And that, of course, says nothing about the third parties, particularly the military officials who would have to undergo two separate depositions.

Third and final, Your Honor, Ms. Burke indicated that the Virginia case focuses on the abuse at the Abu Ghraib hard
site whereas this case focuses on abuse at a broader array of sites. Mr. Nakhla was only at Abu Ghraib. The complaint only alleges in paragraph six that he was at Abu Ghraib. So there is a direct overlap between any conduct in which he was allegedly involved then Virginia case.

Those are my only points, Your Honor. Thank you. THE COURT: Mr. Bowman.

MR. BOWMAN: Your Honor, I would submit that the main point here is that there, there is going to be duplication of effort. And I don't -- I didn't hear Mrs. Burke, Ms. Burke to say that, that that wouldn't be the case.

First, she did not, she did not say that the plaintiffs here or in Al-Shimari were backing away from their conspiracy allegations, which is an attempt to hold again this corporate defendant and this individual defendant responsible for the actions of third parties, including the CACI defendants who are in the Eastern District right now, as well as the military officials. Those, those are complimentary conspiracy allegations in this case and in Al-Shimari, and it combines the two cases together inextricably.

I also take issue with the notion that, that this -that this case, this Maryland case does not involve the Abu Ghraib hard site. I'd like to read one of the allegations made by one the plaintiffs in this case, Mr. Al-Janabi. And what I'm reading from is his original complaint at Paragraph 40. That
complaint is Exhibit B to our Motion to Transfer.
Mr. Al-Janabi alleges the facts known to date show that Big Steve -- Big Steve is the terminology that Al-Janabi uses to denote one of the CACI employees -- that Big Steve, other CACI employees, example D.J. Johnson and Tim Dugan, and L-3 employees, example Adel Nakhla, conspired with military personnel to torture prisoners kept other the Abu Ghraib hard site. That's an allegation by one of the plaintiffs in this case that pertains to the Abu Ghraib hard site and ties together the defendants in the Eastern District with the defendants in this case with a common set of third-party military officials. And these cases are really inseparable for that reason as well.

I'd like to also point out that Judge Robertson's ruling on Motions to Dismiss, which are -- which is what is pending in this Court as well as in Eastern District, was identical as between the two corporate defendants. It was at the next stage, Motion for Summary Judgment where the treatment diverged.

So, following up with that point, there is no need to re-brief Motions to Dismiss at this stage, mainly because as the Court knows, Maryland and the Eastern District are both within the Fourth Circuit. There's no change of law based upon a transfer to the Eastern District.

That was not the case when, when the prior, when the Saleh case was transferred from the Eastern District to D.C.

Circuit. There was a change of circuit precedent that was controlling and did result in re-briefing. That's not the case here. These motions could be shipped over to Eastern District and decided by Judge Lee on these papers.

THE COURT: Let me ask you, both counsel this issue. What would prevent the Court from keeping the case now, deciding the Motion to Dismiss and then consolidating, transferring later?

MS. BURKE: Your Honor, that would certainly be possible.

THE COURT: I mean, you've got the case briefed now. I'm not making any commitment, but suppose I could write my opinion faster than Judge Lee, then what?

MS. BURKE: Yes, Your Honor. Then your opinion would be the law of the case.

THE COURT: Well, may or may not, but in any event, I mean, in some ways what you're doing is saddling Judge Lee with at least another round of reading your briefs and trying to decide them. I may be able to go forward and decide this with some dispatch. So what's lost with the Court going through the Motions to Dismiss and then looking at it again and seeing what needs to be done?

MS. BURKE: Well, we think, Your Honor, that that
would -- in terms of judicial efficiency, which is the cornerstone of their argument, that that would certainly save
resources.

THE COURT: In candor, I'm a little bit hesitant to just sort of dump this case with 71 or two plaintiffs and a different defendant on Judge Lee now, whose got a fairly, seems like a somewhat more discreet issue, even though there's some relationship. It might be better sorted out. I mean, this case may not survive a Motion to Dismiss here.

MR. BOWMAN: Your Honor, my partner would like to --

THE COURT: Are you arguing the Motion to Dismiss?

MR. ZYMELMAN: I am, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay, go ahead.

MR. ZYMELMAN: And obviously, Your Honor, the decision as to whether to retain this and decide the Motion to Dismiss and then transfer is obviously within your discretion.

In terms of efficiency, however, if the cases are to be transferred, which we, as Mr. Bowman argued we believe is essential if the cases are to go forward, to have the Motions to Dismiss decided in two separate places, given especially that the posture of where Judge Lee's case is, which is he hasn't issued his ruling yet. And so -- and the arguments in our Motions to Dismiss overlap to a large degree, not entirely, but to a large degree with the arguments that are in front of Judge Lee. And to simply add these motions to his consideration of these issues we think would be a matter of efficiency for these cases to basically proceed directly.

For example, you may deny the Motion to Dismiss and Judge Lee might grant the motion, or -- excuse me -- and may grant the motion or vice versa. And there's no reason why these cases should be proceeding in two different courts given the overlap of both legal and the factual considerations that militate in favor of --

THE COURT: Yeah, but the issues you're raising now, the issues of convenience of parties and witnesses, that's not really a factor right now. I mean, it's a legal issue right now. Nobody has to travel anywhere. I mean, that's really not there. And choice of forum issue, I mean, you're here, you've got some plausible presence here. So those arguments are either abstract or they may eventuate down the road, but --

MR. ZYMELMAN: There's no question, Your Honor, that the considerations in terms of the witnesses don't apply at the Motion to Dismiss stage. However, I believe the efficiencies that are set forth -- we filed a Motion to Transfer, obviously, well before we filed the Motion to Dismiss. Our view was that the Motion to Transfer should be decided first, put the cases on the same track. And for all we know, and again, Judge Lee doesn't keep me informed. He may be waiting to see if this case is coming over there if he's aware --

THE COURT: Has anybody talked to him? Does he even know that this is going on?

MR. ZYMELMAN: We don't know, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Does he know this case is pending?
MS. BURKE: No, Your Honor, and we have not alerted him to that.

MR. ZYMELMAN: I am -- we have no indication one way or the other, Your Honor, but we do think that there is -- to have the case -- again, we're perfectly -- you know, we filed our Motions to Transfer long before, as I said, before the argument to --

THE COURT: Well, but now you are where you are, so.
MR. ZYMELMAN: We are where we are, Your Honor, and that decision obviously is your decision on what constitutes greater efficiencies.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, in some ways, as I say, greater efficiencies probably favor in my keeping the case now, because I'm ready to decide it, not this minute, but in the same way Judge Lee is not. He's going to have to go back and do some back-tracking to fold this case into the case he's got. There's no question about it. And in some ways, we're ahead of him on that.

Now, I understand that you're concerned that you may get split results here; that one may decide one way and one may decide the other and, you know, that's still --

MR. ZYMELMAN: Obviously, Your Honor, if you're going to grant the Motions to Dismiss, that would --

THE COURT: You'd be delighted.

MR. ZYMELMAN: We'd be delighted. However, we are making our argument without making a presumption one way or the other --

THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. ZYMELMAN: -- which way you're going to --
THE COURT: No, I'm not prepared to tell you one way or another on that. I mean, I've obviously, faced some of these arguments. I think you got my Lazarbe spin this weekend and some of these issues have come up before obviously.

MS. BURKE: Your Honor, I'd just add a further note on the efficiency. We have already had a conference about the scope of discovery with a decision by the magistrate on what discovery would look like --

THE COURT: What are you talking about? Where?
MS. BURKE: In the Eastern District of Virginia. So you know, and clearly the scope of discovery contemplated for a four person case in one location is dramatically different than what will be needed for a multi-location. So again, you know, just further the efficiency of your keeping the case.

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Bowman.
MR. BOWMAN: Your Honor, I would like to add that one of the factors in the cases we've submitted that deal with transfer for consolidation is to avoid the risk of inconsistent judgments.

THE COURT: I understand. That's certainly the case.

MR. BOWMAN: Very briefly, I see my time is just about up. I would like to address one other point made by Ms. Burke. THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. BOWMAN: She said that in the past there was a case transferred and then the plaintiff lost jurisdiction over an individual. I believe that the instance that she was referring to was the transfer on plaintiff's motion, not defendant's motion, but plaintiff's motion of the Saleh from the Eastern District to the District of Columbia.

The personal jurisdiction over Nakhla, again, being asserted by the plaintiffs was based upon RICO. The defendants actually opposed that transfer because -- on the basis that the RICO claims were invalid and therefore, there was no personal jurisdiction. You know, in other words, that the case couldn't have been brought there.

The judge, Judge Hilton disagreed and transferred it, but Judge Robertson agreed and dismissed the RICO claim to the individual defendants along with it. So I don't think the facts support the assertion made there.

THE COURT: All right. Final word, Ms. Burke.
I'm sorry, Mr. Bowman, are you done?
MR. BOWMAN: Yes, Your Honor. For the reasons stated in our papers and here at argument, we ask the Court to transfer this case to Eastern District of Virginia.

THE COURT: All right, Ms. Burke.

MS. BURKE: Yes. Just in response to -- just a quick response to his last point, Your Honor. That is what is the cause of our concern here with 1404. In the transfer from Virginia to D.C., Judge Hilton found that the 1404 had been met and there was -- it could have been brought in D.C. And yet as a practical matter, then the receiving Court is not bound by that and they are able to exercise their own judgment as to whether or not there is jurisdiction.

So it simply reinforces the point we made earlier, which is that it's this Court that has to undertake an analysis under 1404 as to whether Sub-section C of the Virginia Long Arm Statute means that jurisdiction is questionable. And if jurisdiction over Nakhla is questionable in Virginia, which we believe it is, then they have not met their burden of establishing --

THE COURT: I understand, but to sort of close that out, you say that you can't cure it by stipulating. But unless a party raises a jurisdictional objection, the jurisdiction is waived, isn't it?

MS. BURKE: It actually, it's -- there's case law that says they can't waive it in order to accomplish a transfer that they want to transfer. So that, basically, your analysis has to set aside the fact that they've waived it.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Bowman.
MR. BOWMAN: Just very briefly, two quick points in
response. The first being that, again, that was plaintiffs' Motion to Transfer to the District of Columbia that caused the loss of jurisdiction. The defendants all opposed the transfer on that very basis, so it's completely distinguishable where here you have the individual defendant joining the motion and submitting an affidavit establishing the facts necessary.

THE COURT: Very well. We'll break until two o'clock and pick up then.

I may be prepared to address the Motion to Transfer issue when we come back at 2:00 o'clock, and then we'll hear you on the Motions to Dismiss. Frankly, I'm inclined to tell you right now that I will probably hold it and look at it for later review, since I think the case is pretty ripe for a review at this point and see what we do, but I'll have more to say when we come back.
(Recess taken at 1:03 p.m., and resuming at 2:05 p.m.)
THE COURT: Anything anybody want to say on the Motion to Transfer?

MR. ZYMELMAN: Your Honor, Ari Zymelman for -THE COURT: I can hear you.

MR. ZYMELMAN: Ari Zymelman for L-3 Services. At the lunch break, at the lunch break, we checked with counsel for CACI who told us that Ms. Burke was mistaken. Judge Lee has been told about this case. Both in the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and for the Motion to Stay Discovery was told
about the pendency of this case.
MS. BURKE: Your Honor, just on that, the question I believe was whether he'd been told about the date of this oral argument, and to the best of my knowledge, what I said before is the case, I don't think he's aware we're arguing today.

THE COURT: All right. In this case Wissam
Abdullateff Sa'eed Al-Quraishi and others have sued Adel Nakhla and L-3 Services, Incorporated. The Second Amended Complaint proceeds in 20 counts, but essentially they are counts of, substantive counts, conspiracy counts, aiding and abetting, counts of torture, cruel inhuman or degrading treatment, war crimes, assault and battery, sexual assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent hiring and supervision against the corporate defendant, negligent infliction of emotional distress against the corporate defendant.

The matter is before the Court on the corporation, on L-3 Services' Motion to Transfer which is joined by Defendant Nakhla. The essential background facts are that 72 Iraqi nationals as plaintiffs claim mistreatment during their capture and detention by the U.S. military, various U.S. military facilities in Iraq during the period July, 2003 until May, 2008. They allege that while they were innocent of wrongdoing and wrongfully captured, they were tortured while detained by the military during the Iraq hostilities. They seek
damages for this torture, alleged torture from L-3 Services and Mr. Nakhla, one of the former employees of L-3. Plaintiffs reside in Baghdad, Iraq with the exception of Mr. Al-Quraishi who is a resident of Jordan. Majority of the plaintiffs claim to have been detained at Abu Ghraib Prison at some point.

Defendant L-3 sold services of Nakhla and other employees to the United States military. Plaintiffs claim that the Defendant L-3 is liable because of the actions of these lone employees, who while assigned to military units that controlled detention facilities in Iraq tortured the plaintiff and aided others in doing so, and/or joined the conspiracy to do so. Without getting into specifics, that's the essential allegation of the, allegation of the case.

There are a number of suits that have preceded this suit that have taken place in the Central District of California, the District of Columbia with varying results. These parties have, the present suit have been parties to one or more other suits. There is presently pending in the Eastern District of Virginia one case that remains in which an alleged corporate co-conspirator, CACI, has been sued along with -- is it one other, did you say, defendant? No other defendant, just the corporation.

MS. BURKE: No individual defendants, Your Honor.
THE COURT: There are four plaintiffs in that case as opposed to the 71 here, and that matter has been briefed on

Motions to Dismiss by the defendants and, by the defendant and is awaiting decision by Judge Lee.

This case comes to this Court. It was filed in June of 2008. The Amended Complaint was filed in November. The Motion to Transfer was filed in September, I guess, of 2008 and then the Motion to Dismiss came in late, November.

The central argument that is made with regard to the Motion to Transfer under 28 U.S.C. Section $1404(a)$, this is a convenience transfer, because clearly there is jurisdiction in this Court given the residence of Defendant Nakhla here and the fact that the plaintiffs are aliens, non-resident aliens.

The defendants have put forth arguments under 1404 (a) and point to the Court the various factors to be considered in the $1404(\mathrm{a})$, convenience transfer. The weight to be accorded the plaintiff's choice of forum, the witness convenience and access, convenience of the parties and interest of justice. And transfer has to be a Court in which the action could have been brought initially.

The first suggestion by the defendants is that Nakhla who is not a resident of Virginia would be subject to jurisdiction there, because if he was an employee and signed his contract to work for L-3 or its predecessor there in Virginia, plaintiffs contest that it's clear that the jurisdiction could have been obtained in Virginia over Nakhla.

In any event, the further argument is made that
although courts ordinarily do accord some weight to the choice of forum by the plaintiffs where the plaintiff is not a resident of the forum state, that is the factor that's given less weight. They further argue that witness convenience and access is important because if the case in Virginia goes forward, witnesses would have to in effect be trying similar issues in two jurisdictions, albeit jurisdictions close to one another. Particularly insofar as the alleged conspiracy between the two corporate entities is involved.

The further argument is that the -- there are arguments that are not made in oral argument today, but the suggestion is that the Eastern District of Virginia is less congested and routinely deals with cases of this type, and highly classified information of the sort that would be involved here.

The plaintiff's argument, of course, is that the burden of proving that there was a clear reason to transfer lies with the plaintiff and -- the defendant, excuse me, and there is no question that there's jurisdiction over Defendant Nakhla here. And they argue that Nakhla, in fact, defeated jurisdiction in the District of Columbia, personal jurisdiction with a similar long arm statute presumably saying he wasn't present there.

The plaintiff also argues that no witness would be particularly inconvenienced because the courts are close
together and that there isn't that much similarity in the issue, via two corporate defendants, albeit allegedly in league in their conspiracy. There are other sites where the alleged torture occurred, not just in Abu Ghraib, which is characteristic exclusively of the sites where the alleged torture occurred in the Virginia case. And that the justice, interests of justice do not require transfer there.

As I say, it's sufficient differences according to plaintiffs in their case and the case in Virginia, which is exclusively Abu Ghraib, located alleged torture before. Plaintiffs here, far greater number of victims would be alleged to have been affected over a five-year period in other sites.

The Court takes note of the fact that this case is in a posture for decision on Motion to Dismiss or Motions to Dismiss, because Nakhla joins. And although the Motion to Transfer was made early on, some of ordinary considerations that one would take into account such as the witness convenience really don't apply at this stage, because the issues before the Court are strictly legal issues. So that factor really seems to drop out of the case, although it's one that defendants set some store by.

The other issue, it's true that to some extent when a plaintiff is not, or plaintiffs are not residents of a forum, the weight according to the plaintiff's choice of forum is less substantial. It doesn't mean it's non-existent, however, and we
have aliens here who, non-resident aliens who are entitled to sue in any jurisdiction in this country. So at least there is the slight tilt in the plaintiff's favor in being here for now. The only issue really that the Court sees that's potentially problematic would be inconsistent verdicts; that is, on similar issues. Whether it's arguing the applicability of the Political Doctrine or some other aspect of the defense.

The cases kind of go both ways on that issue. The Court did a little bit of research on that quickly about inconsistent verdicts being dispositive factor. It's certainly one that one could consider. In Greater Yellowstone Coalition versus Kempthorne, which appears at 2008 Westlaw, 1862298, a decision authored by Judge Sullivan of the District Court of the District of Columbia. He faces the issue of the risk of inconsistent judgments and found that that involved mere speculation about the likelihood of an adverse ruling in the court to which the case was proposed to transfer. And Roth versus Bank of the Commonwealth, which is a 1978 Westlaw 1133, Eastern District of Michigan, 1978. There is some discussion about inconsistent verdicts being a matter of concern, although it talks about duplicitous pre-trial and trial proceedings, which again is not really the issue that the court has here. The only real issue is what happens if this Court decides one way on the Motion to Dismiss and on similar issues Judge Lee decides another way, but seems to me we can cross that
bridge when we come to it.

The Court is going to deny without prejudice the Motion to Transfer, but revisit the issue when we see how we do here. Should for some reason both cases proceed to trial, there's certainly a way we can accommodate a potential problem. Should it appear that it makes more sense for the cases to be consolidated, at least in some if not all respects, we can also visit that at the time. In sum, the Motion to Transfer is denied without prejudice.

Now, let's go right into the Motion to Dismiss, and tell me -- I gather with regard to the Motion to Dismiss, are you dividing up your argument on that motion? How are you going to do that?

MR. ZYMELMAN: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: How are you going to do that?

MR. ZYMELMAN: There are two motions pending. One by L-3 Services, Inc., one by Mr. Nakhla. I'm going to address the issues -- we attempted not to overlap in our briefs and I think the common issue between us in terms of having done some briefing on the issue is the conspiracy, the adequacy of the conspiracy allegation.

Mr. Delinsky is going to -- and I'll let Mr. Delinsky on behalf of Mr. Nakhla address that issue for both of us, but I think that with regard to the issues raised in our brief, I was going to address that, those issues and we're going to divide
the argument basically along the lines of our brief. Other than, I think, as I said, with regard to conspiracy, I'll defer to Mr. Delinsky.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me say, I often find it more helpful from my standpoint in oral argument of a case like this to go issue by issue and hear the response as you make your argument. Now, that may be somewhat problematic with you, but you've got a lot of arguments that you packed in there. And by the time I revisit those arguments, I'm sort of back in the dark again.

Do you have any problem with posing some of your basic
issues, at least, in cluster so I can get response from the plaintiff as we go?

MR. ZYMELMAN: I guess I would like to address sort of the overarching standing, just disability.

THE COURT: All right. Why don't you do that first, but then let me hear their response before you get into some of the other defenses that you're raising.

MR. ZYMELMAN: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. ZYMELMAN: Your Honor, we have prepared per your request notebooks of the cases in advance. I mean, I've tried to select what I think are some of the more important cases. THE COURT: All right.

MR. ZYMELMAN: But they are, it is just some of the
cases. If I could approach?
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you.
MR. ZYMELMAN: We've alphabetized the cases, Your
Honor. So if that --
THE COURT: Very good, okay.
MR. ZYMELMAN: -- by first name.
Your Honor, this -- as you noted in your bench ruling on the Motion to Transfer, this case involves allegations of the misconduct of L-3 employees who were serving as translators in a military controlled prison in Iraq during the war in Iraq, and its occupation.

These claims for these translators were provided to the military under contract to serve in attached military units, to translate and function for these military units, to fulfill billets that would otherwise be fulfilled by military personnel. Because of the great demand, the military could not do so.

These linguist, as one might imagine, in an invasion of an Arab-speaking country were essential to the military mission. The first set of issues I'd like to address is whether there lie civil claims at all by the military detainees, the military prisoners in Iraq, Iraqi prisoners in military controlled prisons during a time of war and occupation.

I think the case, with exception of the cases brought by the Center for Constitutional Rights, Ms. Burke acting on their behalf, are unique and there are no such cases in the
history of the United States which have allowed claims by the occupied persons to be brought against the occupiers.

The first -- there are several doctrines that are at play. The first we would submit is one of standing. The Court in Eisentrager, in the context of habeas ruled that foreign prisoners during an occupation after war had no access to the civil litigation process in this country. That was in the context of habeas.

The recent ruling by the Supreme Court in Rasul and then later Boumediene; Rasul addressing the statutory issue and Boumediene addressing whether detainees at Guantanamo resort to civil courts to vindicate constitutional rights there, the right to habeas, do not change the Eisentrager holding. And in fact, both Rasul and Boumediene indicated that they did not intend to disturb the holding in Eisentrager.

Boumediene made a point of distinguishing Guantanamo from Landsberg Prison, which was the site of the claims in Eisentrager. The distinctions between Guantanamo, which was held as a factual and functional matter to be within the sovereignty of the United States fully, and if not so more so, applied to the military prisons in the Iraqi war zone. The fact that they were prisons abroad in the war zone or in the zone of occupation would, made all the difference in the Boumediene litigation.

This is perfectly consistent with a line of cases that
plaintiffs have not addressed at all in their opposition to our motion, which are the cases dealing with what is called the law of occupation or the law of war. These are cases primarily, but not exclusively, arising out of the Civil War where the issue was both before and after the Civil War, I would say, where the issue was, could the occupied bring claims, civil claims against the occupiers. And the answer and the assumption was, clearly not.

Dow v. Johnson, which we've quoted from in block quotes, because it was surprisingly quiescent 150 years ago, stated that there could not be claims either in the courts of the occupied or the occupiers; of the occupied country or the occupying country against the occupiers. That the only resort to -- the only way to administer punishment and compensation was that which the government undertook.

That doctrine, although it has had little occasion to be applied, because frankly there are -- have been no such claims brought. Never in the history of the United States, this would be the first time, that military prisoners had been allowed to bring claims based on what happened to them in the course of detention.

I would submit that the distinction plaintiffs try to draw that these are claims about torture do not change that analysis. As Dow observed, if what was necessary to bring a claim was to change your allegations, then certainly the victim
of an occupation or of a war would not hesitate to make such claims in an attempt to litigate their cause.

This is also consistent with a line of cases, again as we set forth in our brief, under the Takings Clause. Now, obviously, the holdings in those cases are different. Those were cases that sought compensation for damage to property. But if you look through the cases we've cited and the analysis in those cases, in particular the El-Shifa case from Federal Circuit which goes through the history of these claims, it makes clear that even when there has been a waiver of sovereign immunity in the case of the Takings Clause, that the occupied and people who suffer harm or injury, or damage and that -again, these are property cases because they are Takings cases, that people who suffer damage during the course of a war in an occupation, even in the face of a waiver of sovereign immunity, that the back, the back assumption to that is that there will not be claims arising out the military's conduct of war. And that is true whether they are the occupied or the enemy, or evening neutrals caught in the crossfire.

THE COURT: Is it just a war where the United States is involved, or is it any war anywhere in the world?

MR. ZYMELMAN: Well, the Takings cases are obviously cases where it was the United States. It was the action of the United States. So these precepts are held out as, as international law. The idea that the occupier is not subject to
litigation in its courts or the courts of the occupied.
THE COURT: Well, aren't there in tort, the claims though that have been brought as a result of war time where people are accused of torture brought against the neutral soldiers?

MR. ZYMELMAN: I'm sorry.
THE COURT: Aren't there cases that permit plaintiffs
to go forward against --
MR. ZYMELMAN: Not.
THE COURT: -- against soldiers who are operating, quote unquote, in war time?

MR. ZYMELMAN: Not where it was the United States, Your Honor.

THE COURT: But clearly there are cases where when we're talking about other countries it's been recognized?

MR. ZYMELMAN: The claims, Your Honor, have -- are first of all, are of somewhat more recent vintage. And the claims generally have been against not countries, but against --

THE COURT: Soldiers.
MR. ZYMELMAN: Well, against organized militias, for example, in the Kadic case, which was not viewed as a state. I'm not aware of claims that have been brought against soldiers of other countries. I guess --

THE COURT: You make a blanket statement that war time somehow is off limits.

MR. ZYMELMAN: It is off limits to adjudication in the U.S. courts against the United States.

THE COURT: Well, that's the question I asked, whether it's just the United States. So far, that's true, but seems to me there are cases that have held and I did recently myself hold that someone operating in war time could be liable for --

MR. ZYMELMAN: That is correct, Your Honor, and that's based on, obviously was based on a, the federal tort claim, the Alien Tort Statute or the Alien Tort Claims Act. But as we discussed in the context of that particular act, consistent with this line of cases which have said that aliens, enemy aliens do not have standing to bring claims in this court consistent with the cases that have specifically held that there cannot be claims against the United States.

THE COURT: Well, that's the emendation, if you will, the United States.

MR. ZYMELMAN: That is correct.
THE COURT: We recognize it in other context.

MR. ZYMELMAN: That is correct, Your Honor, that these are claims obviously brought in the United States District Court and the precedent involves whether claims of this sort can be brought where the United States is conducting --

THE COURT: What is the distinguishing feature though of the United States versus some other activity of war involving another power? Why should there be a distinction?

MR. ZYMELMAN: Well, the distinction, Your Honor, I think, and this actually leads right into the Political Question Doctrine, which is why I thought they'd treat them as together.

I believe the distinction, Your Honor, is whether you can have a civil litigation that, in essence, judges acts taken during war time or occupation of the United States. And no one has analyzed the analysis as judge, then Judge Scalia said in the Sanchez-Espinoza case, which is in the ATS, is that it's a very different analysis as to whether you're going to allow such claims in the United States courts where it's the act of foreign sovereigns. But where it's the act of the United States, then that means that it is not appropriate for civil claims to lie. THE COURT: Is the Political Doctrine limited to the United States? I thought it was the doctrine that applied across the board.

MR. ZYMELMAN: Well, Your Honor, the Political Question Doctrine applies to issues that are committed to the, that are committed to the political branches. And it may be applicable in context involving foreign conduct, but generally, but generally that involves commenting on the United -- it could require commenting on the United States relations with other countries. So it does not apply in the separation of powers concern that underlies the -- whether there's a political question where it's the military activity of the United States is not the same analysis where it's the military activity of a
foreign power.
That the military activity of a foreign power may, if you're going to bring claim, if you're going to analyze it would require you to judge whether it is a political question as to allow claims to go forward not because the judiciary is trenching on issues, on Executive and the Legislative Branches conduct of war. It would be on the conduct of diplomacy. And so, therefore, it would have to involve a different analysis.

And I think in the context of it is something that sharply distinguishes the claims that have been brought under the ATS against foreign, for a conduct of foreign soldiers as opposed to conduct of the United States. And that was certainly what Judge Scalia held in the Sanchez-Espinoza case in the context of the ATS.

And I think if you look at the Political Question Doctrine cases, there's no question that if it requires a judgment that, that involves analysis of the military's conduct of the war or conduct of how it supervised within its detention facilities in a war zone, that that judgment would trench on the separation of powers that underlies the political question. And I think you can see that in the cases we've cited in our brief.

And I direct you in particular, obviously, to the Tiffany case, which is the Fourth Circuit case that makes it clear that war time -- how the -- that you cannot allow civil claims to go forward where it would require you to make a
judgment about the military's conduct of defense operations.
But there, there are other cases, some of which post-date Judge Robertson's decision under the Ibrahim case where he rejected application of Political Question Doctrine. There are other cases that have since developed that I think more sharply clarify that it would be a -- it would touch on the Political Question Doctrine to try to allow these claims to go forward given these facts.

That you have, basically, allegation concerning the conduct of linguists assigned to military units in a military controlled prison, in the conduct of the detention and interrogation operations in a war zone and in an occupation that to assess the claims that are present here, which is were these people being adequately supervised. Is it required -- would it inherently require a judgment about whether the military properly allowed or didn't allow the extent to which the linguist could be supervised. It requires a judgment about whether these people were properly detained or not detained.

These are all questions that are inherent. But the fact that they put it in their complaint that they were innocent and they rely upon that shows that that question of their innocence, whether they were security risk or not properly deemed a security risk, or not properly deemed a security risk is inherent in deciding these issues. And that it is impossible to analyze these claims without trenching on the military's
conduct of the war.

And as you pointed out in your recent decision yourself that the political question cases that involved military decision-making are different, are different when it applies to the conduct of the U.S. military operations versus foreign operations.

I would go back to, however, Your Honor, to the fundamental where I started from and I'll come back to political question in a second, but I would go back to the fundamental premise of whether subjects of occupation or, of U.S. occupation or U.S., or enemy aliens can bring civil litigation claims. And it would open a Pandora's box as this does about whether the military can use contractors in their operations, whether the military can use personnel to fill in military billets or not, how they conduct their operations.

The issue that -- one the cases, political question cases that plaintiffs rely upon was the Lane case, which is a Fifth Circuit case that reviews one of the convoy cases. I don't know if you're familiar. There's a series of cases involving use of contractors to conduct supply operations in Iraq. And these are cases brought by the contractor employees against their employers.

That case was initially dismissed on political question grounds. That it was impossible to judge the claims in that case without touching on a political question. The

District Court held that. The Fifth Circuit reversed. However, the analysis in Lane, I think, shows why this case requires dismissal for political question at the Motion to Dismiss stage.

In the Lane case, the claims were fraud. You, employer, lied to me about what things would be like when we got to Iraq. You lied to me about whether we'd be perfectly safe. You lied to me about my conditions of employment. And what the Fifth Circuit said was, you can litigate that case without implicating the military's judgments. You can litigate whether, you can litigate the fraud claim without implicating the military's judgments.

There are also other allegations which they said they were going to allow to go forward, but were again involving the contract -- the relationship between a contractor and its employee, and whether the contractor could or should have done things to keep the employees more safe.

First, none of that implicates what we think is the initial stumbling block here. The initial stumbling block under Dow, under Eisentrager is that the genus of claims by occupied persons against the U.S., based on the U.S. conduct of the war or our occupation have never been permitted to go forward other than in the District of Columbia, and where this issue is not presented in all fairness because of the way the case was litigated.

This issue of whether these parties have standing
under Eisentrager, under Dow was never presented to Judge Robertson?

THE COURT: Why would that be so?
MR. ZYMELMAN: Well, Your Honor, the timing -- that case dates back to 2004. Rasul had come out and had cast some doubt on the continued vitality of Eisentrager. Judge Robertson -- the Motions to Dismiss, as we've heard, the case had kind of moved around from California to Virginia, to D.C. By the time the case was -- the way the Motion to Dismiss was postured, we had succeeded in dismissing all of the federal claims, and all that was left was the state law claims and was limited to a very narrow issue on which we ultimately prevailed. And it wasn't until after, long after this was done that Boumediene came out that made it very clear that Eisentrager retained its vitality. That Boumediene made very clear, if you read it against -- which judge, Justice Stevens from the Rasul opinion joined, that Eisentrager retains its vitality completely. And so, that's why the issue was never presented. And frankly, it is currently pending, the issue on the law of war and so on, is currently pending in that case on the behalf of CACI. So that issue has not, was not presented and had not been decided. And the reason is, as Your Honor I'm sure knows, cases develop and have a -- on their own. And obviously, if I could go back and have written that, but I got judgment in that case, Your Honor, and so I'm not going to go back and
second guess that.
THE COURT: I need you to sort of wind up this phase so we go back and forth on this.

MR. ZYMELMAN: Sure. Your Honor, so I want to go back to the Lane case and the political question cases. And I would focus on the Lane case which is, is -- I think articulates very clearly the distinction between this case and the convoy cases. This is a case of aliens and occupied persons trying to bring a claim based on -- that is inextricably linked with the military, how the military ran its detention facilities, how the military conducted interrogation, how the military supervised the soldiers and the contractors that were assigned to the military units. It is impossible to separate out these issues from the claims that are at issue here.

I would also specifically mention the Bancoult case from the D.C. Circuit which is in your binder, which -- where the claims were that there was a policy decision to take over Diego Garcia. And the complaint, however, was that in doing so, extremely illegal things were done. All sorts of things that on their face were accepted to be tortious and in violation of -and illegal unquestionably. And what the Bancoult Court held was that even -- that the method of carrying out foreign policy and security methods is a political question.

And that's what we're talking about here. We're talking about complaints based on how the military conducted its
detention operations, how the military conducted its interrogation operation. Doesn't mean it's not subject to prosecutorial discretion. Doesn't mean that it's not subject to remediation scheme, which the United States has put in place through the Foreign Claims Act to compensate people.

What it says, as the Dow case held, was that those decisions to punish, to compensate do not lie in civil claims. They lie in with the sovereign and, therefore, we think that under both the political question and the standing issues, these -- the entire complaint should be dismissed.

We also have a issue of derivative immunity, but I thought we'd take that up separately.

THE COURT: Let's hold off on that.
Ms. Burke.
MS. BURKE: Your Honor, this is a case in which people who were victimized in a prison are suing a corporation, not suing the United States. They have standing clearly. The reason that it was not argued before is because the Rasul, the Supreme Court in Rasul v. Bush has spoken so clearly on the issue as to whether or not people that are currently being detained have the courts open to them.

And there the Supreme Court said that 28 U.S.C. 1350 explicitly confers the privilege of suing for an actionable tort committed in violation of the law of nations. The court goes on to say that the fact that they're being held in custody is
immaterial.

Here, we're not even in that situation. What we have are people who were mistakenly swept up and held for a period of time. They're not suing because they were mistakenly swept up and held for a period of time. They're suing because while they were held, L-3 employees tortured them and hurt them. And they were then let go.

So the military has already exercised military discretion as to whether or not these people constitute any sort of threat to the United States. The military judgment here is not being challenged whatsoever by this case. This case can be ruled on without looking in any way at a military judgment.

They tried to, the defendants try to elevate this into something novel and something that necessarily intrudes upon military decision-making. And arguing that the political question compels dismissal here because it's not justiciable.

Robertson dismissed that. We are obviously not in D.C. So looking to the Fourth Circuit, is there anything in Fourth Circuit law that would compel a different result? The answer is in the Tiffany decision. If you read what Tiffany, what the Court of Appeals wrote there, is Tiffany was very clear that the case they were ruling on was not one in which there was an allegation that the government violated any federal laws contained in statute or formal published regulations. So you're outside the realm of alleged illegality and you're in the realm
of just negligence.
Tiffany has another important distinction because, of course, that was a suit against the United States. Here, this is a suit against a private corporation. The United States is well aware of these proceedings, has informed -- has informed us, has informed the Court that they have no present intention to intervene. They have not submitted a statement of interest. It does not entrench upon their sovereignty whatsoever to allow the doors of the federal courthouse to remain open to those who were harmed by an American corporation.

THE COURT: Should they be brought in as amicus and argue that maybe they do have an interest, and we shouldn't go forward in this case?

MS. BURKE: They're certainly free to intervene if they want to, Your Honor. And if you want them to invite them to intervene, that's fine. The truth is that the United States -- every person acting on behalf of the United States has disavowed a United States policy to torture and abuse people. What we're alleging is the rape of a 14 year old. We're alleging people being hung. We're alleging people being stacked up naked in pyramids. This is not a U.S. policy and the United States has not embraced this.

THE COURT: What if they are military who have done it?

MS. BURKE: The military who have done it have been
court marshaled.
THE COURT: No, but have they been sued civilly?
MS. BURKE: The military co-conspirators, say for example, Charles Graner. Say Charles Graner was sued by one of the victims. That case would then proceed under the Westfall Act. And the way in which a case against a government employee or government official proceeds is that the United States is forced to step in and either claim those actions or disavow those actions. So a case against Graner would necessarily involve a United States decision on its own sovereign interest.

Here, what this private for-profit corporation is asking for is that they not even get a statement of interest from the United States, but instead that we simply assume that they were acting in the United States' interest, but the definition of what was in the United States' interest was in their contract.

These people were hired for a reason. They were hired to translate. The contract itself admonished them and contractually bound them to obey the law of war and the United States law. So they were acting outside the scope of their contract with the United States, and they were not in any way benefiting the United States when they raped people, when they abused people, when they tortured people.

The effort to resurrect all the law that has actually been overcome by the common law of war is not going to work.

The Eisentrager case itself doesn't apply. There there had been an actual adjudication that those individuals were enemies of this nation. There's no such adjudication here. In fact, it's the opposite. These people were simply let go. So Rasul and Boumediene clearly control this issue and clearly keep the courthouse doors open to federal claims for what occurred to these people.

THE COURT: Just as a practical matter, why couldn't everybody who is detained in war time come in and claim these international horrible acts and say, well, at least we're entitled to our day in court on this? Wouldn't you just be always involved in hearing cases by aliens, leave aside enemy aliens, just people who are in any way affected by war time? MS. BURKE: Well, the reason -- there are several reasons that you wouldn't. And that is because not all harm done to people had a private actor involved. So say you are an alien and you were hurt by the United States, that is -- that would be a claim against the United States. And there the Federal Tort Claims Act defines the scope of the waiver of sovereign immunity, and expressly carved out from that waiver of sovereign immunity if acts occurring in a foreign country.

In addition, there is -- carved out from that are combatant activities. So if everyone who were hurt by the United States abroad tried to get in these courthouse doors, they would be shut because of sovereign immunity.

What's different here and what is a natural limitation on a number of these cases is that this is not a case where it was the United States acting. This is a case of for-profit corporate employers, the for-profit corporate employees who did the acting. So it's really much more akin to a straightforward tort suit. It certainly happened abroad and it happened in a prison, but it is a straightforward claim of assault and battery, abuse by corporate employees.

So, Your Honor, for that reason we think the Supreme Court decisions clearly, clearly bestow standing on the victims here, and that the Political Question Doctrine, which really speaks to a separation of powers, does not apply here. You will be able to -- there will be able to be a trial in this courtroom that does not question military judgments.

THE COURT: You want to respond to that issue, Mr. Zymelman.

MR. ZYMELMAN: A couple of, respond to a couple of points. First of all, she, Ms. Burke talks about, well, this is just a suit against L-3 employees. Of course, that is not quite accurate in the sense that she's seeking to hold the corporation liable for the act of the employees. And she's seeking to hold both Mr. Nakhla and L-3 liable not just for the acts of the corporation and the employees, but the acts of the military and the acts of alleged, and CACI who are allegedly in the conspiracy.

So this is sort of a camel's nose in the tent that basically would allow claims for all the conduct, not just the conduct of the L-3 and --

THE COURT: Well, but suppose you're right about conspiracy, but not on the other counts. Could part of the claim survive?

MR. ZYMELMAN: I don't think so, Your Honor, because again, let's take a look at negligent supervision. Let's take a look at the liability issue. How is it possible -- for example, she, plaintiffs repeat again, well, we were released. We were innocent.

Well, the issue is that as set forth in the reports and it's very clear, people were not picked up in the middle of a war in an occupation just because, to see whether they are liable for criminal acts. They were picked up as potential security risk. And situations change and time passes, and they are released.

The difference between Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo for the purposes of these arguments are, there are multiple differences. In the case of Guantanamo, you didn't have enemy aliens. Enemy aliens is a status. You are, you are an Iraqi with whom we're at war or which is currently under occupation. That makes you an enemy alien.

The people held in Guantanamo were, the issue there was are they enemy combatants which would allow you to treat
them and detain them differently. There's no question about your ability to detain enemy aliens during a war and an occupation.

The people in Guantanamo were detained as Boumediene made clear for long periods of time, indefinite detention, not subject to any review in what was later held to be a functional part of the United States. And that's the key point on which those decisions turn.

The issue of how the -- it is -- this is not just a suit based on a prison. This is a military prison during a war and an occupation where the prison is being run by the military and the people who are being picked up are being picked up not just to be incarcerated subject to, for punishment. They're being picked up as security risk. They are being picked up as having intelligence value.

I mean, a lot of the people were picked up and later released because they were determined not to have intelligence value. But the fact of how -- what happened to them in those prisons by the military, by L-3 during the war, it is impossible, Your Honor, I would submit to analyze those claims without touching on the military's conduct of the war or the military supervision of the prison.

And frankly, plaintiff don't contest any of that. They have not said, oh, yes, you can get into this without how the military supervised the prisons and, you know, what they
said was, it happened to them while they were in the prisons. Well, the military is indisputably in control of the prison. How much resources the military devotes -- I mean, if these to -- controlling the prisons and how much staffing and how much protection of the prisoners. I mean, if these people were acting as rogues outside the scope of employment for which they were hired, then there's no liability for the corporation. If they were acting as part of their, within the scope of employment, within the control of the military, then how do you analyze that without touching on a political question.

And again, the Rasul and the Boumediene cases are particular to Guantanamo. Justice Stevens' comment about Section 1350, as we articulated in our reply is inapplicable to this situation.

First of all, it was dicta. It's clearly dicta. The ATS claims had been abandoned.

THE COURT: That's not all we have to go on, you know, of course.

MR. ZYMELMAN: Well, but the problem with relying upon dicta, in a different situation -- again, these are claims by people held in Guantanamo, which is held to be a functional equivalent of the United States. These are claims by -- the issue in the, in that case, in the Rasul case was whether they had any access to review of their detention. It was not whether you can bring damage claims.

Plaintiffs' counsel referred to Dow as old law. Well, that old law has been applied as recently as the 1980's in the D.C. Circuit when there was a case involving the occupation of Germany to say that there is no right to bring claims against the occupiers in either the country that's occupied or in the United States Court.

I left me notebook behind --

THE COURT: That's all right. I need you to sort of move on anyway. I want to get to some of the these other issues. I just want to hit the high points with you. I've got your briefs.

Ms. Burke, you want to say something very briefly in response on this point and then we'll move on to another argument.

MS. BURKE: Yes, Your Honor. Really just want to make the distinction. What counsel, when counsel is talking about potential claims against the United States for failure to supervise, that's a different type of claim and that's -- that would be governed by the Goldstar case, where essentially, you know, that the occupying power wasn't diligent and didn't protect them. That's not the claim we're making here. We're making the claim for the direct torture that was caused by $\mathrm{L}-3$. THE COURT: All right. Well, I assume I'm going to hear about derivative immunity in a moment, so let's go right into that.

Go ahead.
MR. ZYMELMAN: Your Honor, as you said, it turns next on the other ground we have, which would be an absolute bar to these claims would be the Doctrine of Derivative Immunity.

As plaintiffs' counsel just indicated, there's no question that the United States is immune under 13, under Section 1350. That's the Goldstar holding where there were claims brought and the United States was held to be sovereignly immune.

The case law in the Fourth Circuit, in the Butters and Mangold cases is very clear that if there's a function which has been delegated for which the United States is immune, the fact that they've delegated it to private contractors does not, makes those contractors themselves immune.

Butters is a particularly good example of that. There it wasn't even the United States. The immunity was that of Saudi Arabia where the, the suit was as, of an employee against its employer. Again, on its face, seemingly no involvement in the government's immunity. But because the conduct at issue was taken on behalf of the Saudi Arabia, the employer was held to be immune.

Mangold is an example of a case of clearly tortious conduct, clearly improper conduct that was held to be immune because the function that had been delegated to the corporation. Here again, it's undisputed. The linguists were loaned, as you
described them, loaned to the military to fill military billets. They were performing war-time functions for the government, translating as part of military units.

The argument, well, there wasn't a -- you know, they weren't loaned to engage in torture. Well, of course not. And there's no question that plaintiffs cannot sue and are not suing as third-party beneficiaries of L-3's contract with the government.

The question here is, was the function being performed by the L-3 employees. The job that they were doing, not the acts they were included -- not the acts that they were accused of. There was no -- there was no delegation to commit slander. There was no delegation to commit defamation in the case of, the Mangold case. There was no delegation to commit sex discrimination in the case of the Butters case.

Here, the delegation, the job, the function as the Fourth Circuit has put it, that was delegated to the L-3 employees was to be attached to military units to perform translation in support of detention and interrogation operations, which the Supreme Court has recognized is inherently incident, important incident of the power of war.

And for the same reason that this is a political question, that analysis of these claims would trench on a political question on the government's conduct of how it conducted the war, under the Derivative Immunity Doctrine in the

Fourth Circuit, under the holding in Goldstar, it would be these employees and L-3 is immune for the conduct.

And obviously, immunity carries with it, just as closing the courthouse doors to aliens, enemy aliens, or closing the courthouse doors to occupiers carries with it the situation where people, even assuming it's true what they allege, even assuming that this torture took place and the people they accused of engaging in the torture in fact did it, assuming it's true, it keeps out meritorious claims.

And the reason is because of the fundamental judgment in the case of Political Question Doctrine. It's the judgment that those issues are committed to, in the case of the conduct of war, to the executive and the Congress in terms of declaring wars.

In the case of derivative immunity of this function it, is committed to the United States. The function is, one, how they fight the war, how they conduct interrogation, how they conduct detention operations for which the value of attaching immunity outweighs the harm from not allowing these things to proceed in civil suits.

Again, as we pointed out in our brief, every case, every case to have considered allegations of these type of allegations, mostly in Guantanamo, although not exclusively, has held a torture where U.S. employees, U.S. government officials have been accused in torture. Every case to have considered
them has dismissed them either under Westfall, which is subject to Court review. It's the Court that ultimately decides whether the conduct was within the scope of employment under Westfall or under the political question doctrine.

You have Harbury which is, post-dates Judge
Robertson's opinion in the binder that I gave you where they hold on both grounds, both on Westfall and on Political Question Doctrine. CIA operatives who engaged in torture abroad, that would be a political question. And so, for the same reason, the function that is given to these -- for the same reason that this conduct is within the scope of employment for Westfall purpose, I would submit that there should be derivative immunity based on Butters, based on Mangold. It's clear that the United States is immune under Goldstar and, therefore, the immunity should be derivative to the employees.

THE COURT: All right, Ms. Burke.
MS. BURKE: Your Honor, there is serious flaws in
counsel's argument. First, the Supreme Court teaches that you cannot look to a functional analysis to decide on immunity. You look at the Richardson case at Page 408 to 409, the Supreme Court is quite clear that, and I quote, the Court has sometimes applied a functional analysis in immunity cases, but only to decide what type of immunity, absolute or qualified, a public official should receive.

It has never held that the mere performance of a
governmental function can make the difference between unlimited 1983 liability and qualified immunity, especially for a private person who performs a job without government supervision or direction. So cannot just invoke this functional analysis and say, because we were transacting and but for the government contract, a military person would do it, therefore we're immune. Instead you have to look at what the government asked you to do.

Counsel said, well, in Butters v. Vance there wasn't any delegation to commit sexual discrimination, and yet, you know, they were immune to that. That's not accurate. Butters v. Vance actually turned on just that point. There was a factual determination. There was discovery and factual analysis as to whether or not the Saudi Arabian government had directed the company to sexually discriminate against a woman.

And what the Court found is that the Saudi government for its own reasons and consistent with its own culture directed something that would be illegal and unlawful in our culture and in our society. The Saudi government directed that a woman not be placed in the control room, so they made an express finding that the government had directed that very action.

Same analysis in Mangold. Again, the Fourth Circuit went into a factual determination as to whether the government contractor claiming the immunity had been told what, had been told by the government. And the scope of the immunity was not broad and overreaching. It was limited to that precise issue.

And so they looked at, for example, in that case whether information had simply been given in response to investigator's question or whether it had been volunteered. If it was answering questions, it was covered. If it was volunteered, it wasn't.

So all of the immunity cases are very clear that you define any immunity that exist by the scope of what the United States Government directed and said to do. I think a case that is on point, another Supreme Court decision that's very on point when you look at the facts is the Malesko case.

There there was a prisoner who had a heart problem. The private company had been told, don't make that guy take the steps. Make sure he takes the elevator. One of the guards had him take the steps, and he had a heart attack. In a footnote there, the Court pointed out in footnote six that Boyle, the Derivative Sovereign Immunity, the government contractor defense that they're seeking here, that that wouldn't apply because he hasn't been directed on what to do.

So I think, Your Honor, what is missing for their invocation of immunity is some evidence that the United States government asked them to do this. Now, certainly there were military officials that co-conspired, but Richardson teaches, you're not entitled to stand in the shoes of your co-conspirator.

There's no evidence on the record and there will be no
evidence on the record that the United States requested them to rape that young boy; that the United States requested that they stack these men up in a pyramid with boxes in between. All of the conduct that happened to our plaintiffs was conduct that was illegal conduct, that was a conspiracy between their employees and certain bad actors in the military, and CACI as well. So there's no government direction here sufficient to confer immunity, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Zymelman.
MR. ZYMELMAN: Your Honor, as we talked about in our reply brief, Richardson v. McKnight, if anything, points the other way. Richardson v. McKnight was a 1983 case. It's a -THE COURT: Could you speak louder please? MR. ZYMELMAN: Sorry. Richardson v. McKnight, if anything, points the other way. It was a statutory case under Section 1983. And I think Malesko, which I think is directly, you know, is very informative certainly on the issue of whether corporations can be liable under common law for federal common law claims, which is the subject of the ATS we'll get to. But Malesko is distinguishable and Richardson v. McKnight are different. Richardson v. McKnight, one of the things that it turned on was that historically state prisons -- this was a state prison. It wasn't a federal prison. Historically state prisons were not necessarily public undertakings. Historically, the conduct of war and the conduct of soldiers in military prisons during time of war is the essential federal governmental undertaking. And that's a significant fundamental difference between McKnight and this case. McKnight went through a very careful analysis of the history of state prisons and whether it would be correct to assume that there would be derivative immunity.

Here, a novel question, but one which I think is basically inarguable is that the history is that the conduct of military prisons during time of war in a zone of occupation, during a time of occupation is historically a governmental function. And therefore, the delegation of activities within that prison, under control -- and that was another significant issue in Richardson. Richardson was that the private contractor as in Malesko was in charge of the prison.

Here it's undisputed that the military was in charge of the prison. And so, therefore, the issue of, the issue of whether it's historically a function for which immunity should attached, it was answered differently in Richardson than it should be here.

With regard to the issue of direction, the Mangold case is not as finely parsed as plaintiff would have you read it. Mangold said that the, because the function of reporting to the government was, was -- had been delegated, then the conduct which was admittedly tortious would be subject to immunity.

And we submit that the conduct of our employees in the
military prison as loaned employees to the military given that they were there for military functions is similarly entitled to immunity.

THE COURT: All right. Final word on that, Ms. Burke. Anything further?

MS. BURKE: Your Honor, that's simply inaccurate. When you look at the expectations of the United States vis-a-vis the contractors and you look at the common law of war about the contractors, what's clear is that the entire preexisting legal tort regime is expected and anticipated to apply to those contractors.

THE COURT: All right. Let's go on to your next point.

MR. ZYMELMAN: The next issue, Your Honor, is the Alien Tort Statute. And quite simply, this was an issue that's already been litigated in the Saleh case and the Ibrahim case. Judge Robertson twice ruled -- oh, I take it back. Once and then again on summary judgment reconfirmed it, that the Alien Tort Statute does not apply to these types of claims.

The analysis is based on Sanchez-Espinoza, which is the only circuit case to address ATS claims brought against for the, brought against private individuals for conduct on behalf of the United States.

The Sanchez-Espinoza was a case involving the
Iran-Contra. The claims were against both government officials
and contractors who supposedly acted in conspiracy and at their direction. And the accusations were very much similar here; rape, torture, extrajudicial killing.

Then Judge Scalia analyzed the law under the ATS and found that when the state, that state action for claims of torture and war crimes require that, that -- that claims for torture and war crimes require state action, or in the case we would submit of war crimes, certainly, the action of a belligerent. That the, when that actor, either the state or the belligerent is the United States, to allow claims under the ATS would trench on the sovereign immunity of the United States.

That holding, obviously, is the, it's been -- that's the subject of the appeal in the Saleh and Ibrahim cases, but Judge Robertson clearly analyzed the issue as it was presented here and found that there were no claims. In this case I don't think plaintiffs make any attempt to distinguish this case from the case, from Judge Robertson's decision. They basically say, well, this is a different circuit and you should go in a different direction.

First of all, they submit no contrary authority. There is no contrary authority where the United States was the state actor that allowed ATS claims to go forward. And everything in Sosa supports that, the analysis in

Sanchez-Espinoza. Nothing in Sosa suggests that where the United States is the state actor for a valid ATS claim.

Obviously, Sosa held that the claim there was not a valid claim, but there is nothing -- all the implications in favor of a limited judicial remedy of carefully examining not only the claim, but the actors against which the claim is brought to see whether there should be an extension under the federal common law -- in Sosa supports the decision in Sanchez-Espinoza.

As we've briefed extensively that plaintiff's reliance on Kadic, which is a Second Circuit case which involved a foreign power, it wasn't even a foreign power. It involved a foreign state-like group to which they had extended the claims that had previously been reserved just for states, that nothing in Kadic undercuts the rational or the holding in

Sanchez-Espinoza. And there's no reason why this Court should reach a different conclusion than Judge Robertson did in his case on exactly the same claims.

I think it is important to note that Sosa says that claims under the ATS or federal common law claims, and as such the question is whether you should extend and find a new claim here where the United States is the state actor both for the torture or the, the belligerent in the case of the war crimes case.

We also point out in a couple of different, couple of cases that have since analyzed the issue and clearly articulated the Ninth Circuit case of Abagninin in terms of crimes against
humanity; Saperstein from the District Court case in Florida which analyzed war crimes; both of which said that the mere fact that the claims took place during a time of war is not sufficient to state a claim, that you look to who the belligerent was.

Here the belligerent was, there's no question that the belligerent was the United States. And to allow claims under the ATS against contractors working in military prisons on behalf of the United States would trench as judge, then Judge Scalia said on the sovereign immunity of the United States. And there are no cases, again, there are no cases that have ever allowed this kind of claim to go forward under the ATS.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. ZYMELMAN: The Jama case to which they point to in the District of New Jersey, this issue was never even raised. It's a case against the conduct against a prison by the INS, and other than that I'm not aware of any cases.

THE COURT: All right. Let me hear what Ms. Burke has to say about it.

MS. BURKE: Your Honor, on this issue, we think the Supreme Court has spoken. Sosa itself, the state actor was the United States. The Supreme Court did not say that as a result, we cannot hear the case at all. So what this really is is an effort to raise the same Political Question Doctrine concerns, the trenching on sovereignty.

The mere fact that the state actor is the United States doesn't control. We hold ourselves as the rule of law. We hold ourselves to the same standards that we hold others to. And so when you look at Kadic and when you look at Sosa, and Sosa's approval of Kadic, we think that the District Court decision in Sanchez-Espinoza was just wrong and has been overruled by Sosa.

The fact that Robertson was not persuaded by that was unfortunate, but Sosa itself said, ATS cannot be stillborn. And that's exactly what the analysis of the defendants lead you to, that it would be an illusory, it would be an illusory cause, because if you have enough state action, then you therefore are out of court.

So we don't, we don't think that there's any validity to that argument and that perusing the Supreme Court decision in Sosa answers the question.

THE COURT: What did Judge Robertson say about this argument?

MS. BURKE: What he said was that he was not free to overturn Sanchez-Espinoza and that it would have to be left to the District Court, the Court of Appeals to determine whether or not that precedent remained valid in light of Sosa.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. ZYMELMAN: A couple points first, Your Honor.
This is part of the problem with the reliance on decisions.

Sosa's decision was there was no claim for arbitrary detention. How one goes from that to a decision that if there was a claim for arbitrary detention and the United States was the state actor, you had a claim, this is -- you would have a claim under the ATS is beyond me, Your Honor.

There was absolutely no discussion whether if there had been a claim for arbitrary detention under, under international law, whether that claim would apply if the United States was the primary actor, it's not good -- it's not the way we, not the way we look to cases.

Judge Robertson fully considered their arguments that Sosa had overruled, had overruled the Sanchez-Espinoza. First of all, again, how does the Supreme Court case that doesn't even mention the decision overrule a circuit opinion is beyond me, but he in fact says that Sosa points the other way.

I'm looking for the exact quote. Hold on. Sorry, this is the wrong -- this is the 2007 opinion. If you look at --
(Pause.)

MR. ZYMELMAN: Anyway, Judge Robertson clearly
addressed that issue in his opinion and found that Sosa had nothing to say about it, and if anything supported our, the ruling he made.

The assertion that ATS would be illusory if the United States, if there's no claim when the United States is the state
actor is, of course, completely false. In the decision you just recently made, the issue was if you had a foreign power you did have claims under the ATS. And so all the jurisprudence that has arisen under the ATS, all the claims that have been recognized and allowed to go forward involve a foreign power. And then Judge Scalia in his opinion in Sanchez-Espinoza specifically identified that there was a difference, that he knew about -- his opinion happened after Filartiga. He specifically said, Nothing I say here disturbs the holding in Filartiga, which was the first case to recognize claims for torture going forward.

This is not a jurisdictional -- this is not a courthouse barring issue. This is an element of the claim. And what judge, then Judge Scalia found is that to the extent that the United States is the state actor or the belligerent, there is no claim under the ATS. That does not make the statute illusory specifically when he recognized, when he recognized that nothing he did here disturbs the Second Circuit's holding in Filartiga, which found liability when it involved the foreign power.

His language on that was quite specific about the difference that the nature of sovereign immunity for the United States is very different than that for foreign powers. I'll see if I can find the quote.

THE COURT: Well, that's all right. You know, I'll
be, I'll be involved in all these cases for --
MR. ZYMELMAN: Anyway, Your Honor, if you look at the Saleh case at Page 4 of the printout I've given you in your notebook, it says, Arguing that the Supreme Court Sosa -plaintiffs argue that the Supreme Court Sosa opinion approved Judge Edward's view in --

THE COURT: Slow down a little bit if you would. MR. ZYMELMAN: I'm sorry?

THE COURT: You need to slow down because the court reporter has to be with you.

MR. ZYMELMAN: Oh, I'm sorry, Your Honor.
Sosa did not overrule that precedent, referring to Sanchez-Espinoza. In Sosa's pointed admonition that lower federal courts should be extremely cautious about discovering new offenses among the law of nations certainly cannot be read as an endorsement of Judge Edward's view in Tel-Oren. Sanchez-Espinoza makes it clear that there is no middle ground between private action and government action at least for purposes of the Alien Tort Statute.

So Judge Robertson made very clear, he analyzed these arguments about Sosa, found them not well-founded. The suggestion that this makes it illusory is itself not correct, because it doesn't touch any of the cases that have actually gone forward under the ATS involving foreign powers. THE COURT: All right. Final word on this, Ms. Burke,
please.
MS. BURKE: I'll just make a short point, Your Honor, and that is that the state actor requirement is a jurisdictional on certain of the claims, but not on war crimes. And so Mr. Zymelman has been conflating the state actor, United States as the belligerent and state actor. Even if, which we don't agree with, but even if that argument had any merit, it doesn't touch the war crimes claims.

MR. ZYMELMAN: Your Honor, Sanchez-Espinoza also involved claims of war crimes. The holding was exactly the same. And as we laid out in our brief and, frankly, within the cases we cited, which are Saperstein and Abagninin from the Ninth Circuit, it's clear that there is the same -- that belligerent is required. And the analysis in Sanchez-Espinoza for why you would not allow claims under Section 1350 to proceed where the United States -- it's the action of the United States.

There's no question that the United States -- that this was all conduct during a war of the United States. And to say that you're going to allow claims based on war crimes where it's the United States' war would trench on the United States' sovereign immunity no less than to allow claims for torture. And the analysis, as we said, is, would -- is exactly the same. THE COURT: All right. Let's take about a seven or eight minutes break and then we'll pick up. (Brief recess.)

THE COURT: All right. Ready to go?
MR. ZYMELMAN: Your Honor, I had two more ATS related issues I wanted to touch on quickly.

THE COURT: Go ahead.
MR. ZYMELMAN: The first is we had a couple of, we have a particular argument with regard to inhuman and degrading treatment, that that doesn't meet the standard under international law. We cite the Aldana case, which I think summarizes that very clearly. And I think the fact that, the authority on which that's -- on which those claims rely has been, was rejected as recently as 2004 by Sosa and therefore doesn't state a claim.

We have two alternate grounds for why there is no ATS claims against $\mathrm{L}-3$ in particular. The first is that corporations are not liable under the ATS. I believe that's been fully briefed, but let me just touch on it very quickly. As Sosa makes clear, claims under the ATS is one of the few little pockets of federal common law that has been approved to go forward. We think the strongest analogy for that area is the, is the case law under Bivens. Malesko which plaintiff's counsel cited to you makes clear that corporations are not assumed to be liable, unlike in the statutory setting where in the federal common law setting you don't assume that corporations are liable. Under international law, corporations are not liable. And therefore, we would submit, Your Honor,
this obviously applies to L-3 Services, Inc. only that corporations are not liable under the ATS.

We've gone through the case law. There's case law both before and after Sosa that have held corporations to be liable. We don't believe that they've analyzed the issue correctly, and I think we spelled that out in our brief. I'm happy to go into greater detail about that.

THE COURT: Don't. We need to cover a lot of ground yet, so.

MR. ZYMELMAN: Then the second area also from the Bivens analysis, and it really echoes the issues that we addressed earlier with regard to political question, with regard to standing, which is that are there special factors, are there special factors that counsel against the finding of a cause of action. And that would provide an alternative ground for the rationale that Judge, then Judge Scalia articulated in Sanchez-Espinoza, that Judge Robertson endorsed in his opinions, which is that when you, when you are involved in cases such as this which do touch on the military, conduct of the military, that that's a special factor that should counsel against the finding of a cause of action. And we submit that's an alternative ground for finding that there are no ATS claims for these claims.

At this point, Your Honor, I would turn to the -THE COURT: Perhaps she has a response. You've raised
a couple new points here. So let me just hear her quickly on those points.

MS. BURKE: Your Honor, just very quickly. First, in terms of the cruel and inhuman degrading treatment, the case law that we've cited in our briefs speaks to the fact that there are -- that term covers a range of conduct. We're really, the conduct that we have alleged is at the core and it is covered by ATS .

The second point on the corporations, we think that if you look, for example, at the recently decided Pfizer case by the Second Circuit, you've got have Khulumani, Wiwa, Bowoto, Aldana. The weight of the jurisprudence in this area is clearly that corporations are covered. And I would just point out even in Malesko, the Court there was not looking at the question -the Court there was looking at a different question, which was whether or not to extend Bivens. And the Court noted, well, you know, it's interesting that the plaintiff just didn't go with an alternative regular tort liability theory.

So, in that case, Bivens is not a close fit with ATS and that case really does not counsel against private corporations being held liable.

THE COURT: All right. Let's move on to your next point, Mr. Zymelman.

MR. ZYMELMAN: Turning to state law claims, Your Honor, counts ten through 20.

By the way, just the footnote $I$ was referring to in Sanchez-Espinoza is footnote number five where he specifically mentioned that nothing in Sanchez-Espinoza disturbs or makes illusory the ATS law with regard to foreign sovereigns.

There are ten counts in the complaint we submit, Your Honor, that involve, that are based on diversity jurisdiction that would be based in state law. We submit, Your Honor, that those are, those claims would be governed by Iraqi law if, if they're allowed to proceed.

I mean, I will -- let me give advance notice now. As I'm sure you've read in Judge Robertson's opinions, the next stage after the state -- not all the state law claims were dismissed in those cases, was we move for summary judgment based on preemption. We did not make that as a Motion to Dismiss argument in light of Judge Robertson's ruling that it was appropriate for summary judgment. We will, of course, move for that and to, if necessary, address the state law claims that way. However, we don't believe we need to get to that point.

Plaintiffs dispute that Iraqi law would apply here. And they make, basically -- you know, and they -- but they do so without really providing much rationale. Maryland is, as you know, a lex loci jurisdiction. It's indisputable, although they assert without authority to the contrary that lex loci is determined by the place of the injury in tort cases. The injuries here are in Iraq. In fact, plaintiffs' counsel in the
context of the Motion to Transfer identify Iraq is the place where all these, where all this litigation is about.

And there's no question that the injuries alleged took place in Iraq. Under lex loci, that means that Iraqi law would apply. In response, plaintiffs have argued that, that this Court should apply federal common law to these claims without really citing any cases that support that. The two cases they cite involve contract claims.

They don't have any contract claims, Your Honor. They cannot sue under our contract. They tried to do so in the previous litigation when the case was still a would-be class action, and the Court held that they had no standing and no claims under the contract.

This is a tort claim. There is no basis to apply federal common law to what they say are simple assault and battery charges. So then that, that comes back to the question of lex loci points to Iraq. They say it would be against the public policy of Maryland for, to apply Iraqi law because Iraqi law doesn't recognize all of their claims. But that is not the standard for public policy.

We've set forth the cases. I think the Ayres case, which I have included in my binder, summarizes the Maryland law on this situation. Maryland normally looks to a statute for expression of a public policy. There is no such statute here. There's really no basis to overcome what's termed the heavy
burden to say that Maryland should override the law of the jurisdiction where the injury took place.

I don't know if you want me to stop on the choice of law issue and go back, or if you want me to go through and talk about what the implications are for that.

THE COURT: Well, you have a few more minute on it. Go ahead.

MR. ZYMELMAN: Well, Your Honor, since we believe that Iraqi law applies, we submit that under CPA-17, the -- we would be immune from, under Iraqi law. CPA-17 as expressed in the pleadings was an order by the Coalition Provisional Authority, which was later adopted by Iraq when it regained limited sovereignty during, and was applicable during all the time of this complaint.

Plaintiffs say it's no longer applicable at present, but that's now and not during the time of the allegations in this complaint, which end as indicated back in May of 2008 when CPA-17 was still applicable.

CPA-17, Your Honor, provides complete immunity from Iraqi process subject to a waiver from the sovereign, from the United States. It also provides immunity based on claims arising out of the terms and conditions of the contract. We would submit, Your Honor, that where you have an immunity, CPA-17 which was really no different than to implement the law of occupation and the law of war that's referenced, that's in

Dow, that, that you cannot bring state law claims based on conduct that took place during the occupation.

There are -- then the question is, there are particular claims under the complaint, Your Honor, that we believe do not survive under Iraqi law. Plaintiffs are correct that under Iraqi law --

THE COURT: Under Iraqi law is what the CPA says it is? Is that what you're saying?

MR. ZYMELMAN: I'm sorry? CPA-17 is now, is part of the Iraqi law during the relevant period, Your Honor. CPA-17 was the order of the occupying authority which applied to all claims during the occupation that was then adopted by Iraq as part of its law in the context of its limited sovereignty. We don't think it adds much --

THE COURT: When was it adopted?
MR. ZYMELMAN: It was adopt -- CPA-17 was originally adopted in, I believe, May of or June of -- I believe June of 2003. There was a return of limited sovereignty to Iraq in June of 2000 -- June 30, I believe, or July 1st of 2004, but under the UN Resolutions which governed the United States remained an occupying power, and the CPA-17 was continued until at least, the terms of this -- I won't represent what the current status is of CPA-17 under Iraqi law, but it was certainly in force and applicable during the time of these allegations.

With regard to the particular claims under the state
law, Iraqi law does not recognize some of the theories of liability here. And in particular, they do not recognize aiding and abetting, or civil conspiracy liability under these circumstances. That is set forth in some detail in the declaration of our expert.

Plaintiff's have submitted a document unsworn and unverified from their expert, the -- saying that our expert is wrong. However, if you look at the supplemental declaration we have submitted, in fact, he says we're wrong, but his analysis in fact says we're right. And the Court, obviously, under Rule 41.1 needs to determine what the content of Iraqi law is.

We think the declarations, if you read them in sequence, Your Honor, clearly state what Iraqi law is and we don't think there's a natural dispute. To the extent there is a dispute, we would submit before we can have any further proceedings, we need to know what the law is and this Court should hold a hearing on those matters.

But again, we think that the declarations, particularly the supplemental declaration, which goes through what their expert says shows that he does not disagree with our expert. He simply disagrees -- he asserts that she's wrong, but he never affirmatively says there is an action for aiding and abetting, that there is an action for civil conspiracy and he doesn't explain it.

THE COURT: But you said, these causes of action would
not survive your argument about Political Question Doctrine -MR. ZYMELMAN: None of this would, Your Honor, which is why we started off with those.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. ZYMELMAN: And then the final point which we've added in, and again as with the aiding abetting, we've also raised the issue of availability of punitive damages under Iraqi law. Obviously, the aiding and abetting, and the civil conspiracy would not get rid of all of the civil counts, but they would narrow the field, Your Honor. And they would narrow the scope of discovery.

If you are inclined, and obviously, we do not think it would be appropriate to proceed to discovery in this case. We think this can be resolved in the Motions to Dismiss. It is important to define what are the claims that are actually at issue. What is the scope of discovery that's going to be allowed?

It will be a very different case if there is no aiding and abetting, and civil conspiracy because, obviously, that would cut out all of the conduct of the military. It would cut out all of the conduct of CACI. Again, we don't think that would cure the political question issues because, as I articulated before. But if this case is to go forward and again, we believe the next step in this case is to litigate the preemption issue that was resolved in the D.C. litigation, but
the parties -- it would benefit the parties and the Court to identify what are the claims, what are the parts of the complaint that actually state a claim?

And with regard to punitive damages, the unavailability of punitive damages might of course inform the parties' perceptions of how to proceed in the case.

Your Honor, let me -- I think I'll have another chance to get up here and respond to what plaintiffs' counsel has to say, but that is the substance of what I intend to address in my Motion to Dismiss.

Mr. Delinsky will address the conspiracy issues and the issues related to Mr. Nakhla.

THE COURT: I'll hear the response at this point. MS. BURKE: Your Honor, a few quick points on this. First, we think this issue is actually prematurely raised, that discovery really is needed in order to properly apply choice of law rules, because there may well be conduct in the United States --

THE COURT: Well, where do you say the tort occurred or torts?

MS. BURKE: The tort of, the tort of the assaultive battery, the tort of torture occurred in Iraq. No doubt about that. The only question would be the tort of negligent supervision, did that perhaps occur here in the United States. What we do -- the second point I would say, though,

Your Honor, is that the defendants are misreading the Bremer Order. The Bremer Order is something that protects them from being brought into the courts of Iraq, but it doesn't mean that Iraq law cannot be applied. It doesn't immunize them in a way that they have argued.

So I think even if you were to go forward under Iraq law, you could find liability. I mean, the core of this case involves conduct that is universally condemned under the law of every nation. So the disagreement we have with them is that any law of any nation could possibly lead to dismissal here. I just don't think that that's the case. And certainly, the Bremer Order does not stand for that proposition.

When you look to the specifics, I do think you have a dispute before you. I mean, our expert is an actual practicing Iraqi lawyer. The person that they found is someone who observes it from afar. He tells us and has told the Court that these claim are cognizable under Iraq law.

So even if the Court were to apply Iraq law as opposed to federal common law, you'd still reach the same result that the claims can go forward.

THE COURT: How would you arrive at applying a federal common law as opposed to Iraqi law?

MS. BURKE: Well, I think that the reasoning we have here is that the contract itself sets forth their duties. And that is a federal government contract. And so if you look at
enforcing the terms of that contract under federal law, you -it basically incorporates and holds them liable under United States law.

And so that you could craft federal common law to hold them liable and you would look to, the contract looks specifically to American federal statutory law. So, for example, you know, the prohibition against war crimes and the like. And so, that was our reasoning there.

Now, obviously, the ATS claims incorporate --
THE COURT: Sounds more like a third-party beneficiary claim.

MS. BURKE: Well, Your Honor, you know, that may be a claim that we need to amend to add. I mean, it may be that that's the appropriate way to postulate the, the state law claims is as a third-party beneficiary of the duty that they assume to abide by federal law. So, you know, Your Honor, that may be something we move to amend and add.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Zymelman.
MR. ZYMELMAN: Let me just pick up where my colleague ended. As you said, Your Honor, this is -- that is a third-party beneficiary claim. That claim isn't here in this complaint. It was made in prior litigation by this counsel on behalf of the purported class. It did not survive a Motion to Dismiss. It would not survive a Motion to Dismiss here.

The idea that this Court should craft new law and new
duties and obligations under statutes, under criminal statutes that did not provide for civil causes of action is exactly the sort of federal common law making that just didn't survive the Erie, Your Honor, other than in particular areas. And therefore, this is a matter of state law. Should be, should be, you know, should be analyzed under the traditional rules.

The Bremer order says what it says. We've briefed this quite clearly, Your Honor. Again, the Bremer order is perfectly consistent with Dow v. Johnson, the Coleman case, the other cases regarding the law of occupation that says that you cannot bring these kinds of claims. The occupied persons cannot bring these kinds of claims against the occupier. And it would be perfectly consistent to apply the Bremer Order as it's written, as we've briefed. And I'm not going to, I don't want to parse the whole language here, Your Honor. It does more than just simply immunize us from state courts.

THE COURT: Where are we now? Tell me how much more we have on --

MR. ZYMELMAN: At this point, Your Honor, and again, just on the Iraqi law expert, it's not enough that he says that there isn't a case. He has to support his statements with reasoning and we just urge you to read the, read the declarations and decide yourself whether the reasoning is present. And if there's a question, we need to have a hearing. It is not premature, Your Honor, at the beginning of a
case to know what law is going to govern. There is no factual discovery that's necessary here. It's not unknown what they're claiming. It's their claims. They have claimed injury in Iraq. Negligent supervision, even if the conduct, even if the supervision was somehow negligent here, the injury that they are claiming is in Iraq. That mean it points to Iraq. THE COURT: All right. Let's stop on this point. I want to go to the last point. I think we're on conspiracy? MR. ZYMELMAN: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right, Mr. Delinsky. MR. DELINSKY: Your Honor, I have a packet of cases for you. They're all out of the brief, if you'd like. I've tabbed, highlighted and these are the main ones most of which I will not touch on today, but they've all been cited. Thank you, Your Honor. Again, Eric Delinsky on behalf of Adel Nakhla. On Mr. Nakhla's behalf, we have joined fully in L-3's Motion to Dismiss, and in that regard we'll be resting on Mr. Zymelman's argument and I will not repeat them. But we have filed a separate motion to raise two issues that are unique to Mr. Nakhla and that to some degree have application to L-3 Services as well. And both issues are of the same fundamental nature. They are pleading issues. And they go to the fact that in this complaint these plaintiffs for the most part don't allege that Adel Nakhla engaged in the allegedly illegal conduct as to them.

And I want to pause here for a moment, Your Honor. In the briefs and a little bit this morning, my client is often referred to as a torturer. We take great umbrage at statements like that. We do not believe they are true and accurate. And if this case proceeds, we will disprove them.

But that's not for today, because this is a lawsuit brought by specific plaintiffs against my client, and they need to state a claim. And general statements about what my client may or may not have done to other people cannot save the claims against my client that are brought by these particular plaintiffs.

With that said, I'd like to break my argument in two and I'll be very brief. The first part of the argument goes to the plaintiffs' direct claims. I think Your Honor in your bench ruling on the, on the transfer motion refer to them as the substantive counts. My second argument will go to the conspiracy counts, and again, both should be brief.

What I call the direct counts, Your Honor, are that torture, intentional infliction of emotional stress, sexual assault and battery, and so on. I also include in the direct counts aiding and abetting, because as Your Honor set forth in Lazarbe, I hope I'm pronouncing it correct, aiding and abetting requires specific intent and specific facilitation as to a concrete act. So I lump all of those together as the direct claims.

Seventy-two plaintiffs bring direct claims against Mr. Nakhla. Seventy-one of them do not identify a single act that Mr. Nakhla did to any of them. They don't identify any conduct that Mr. Nakhla engaged in as to them. And that's 71 of the 72 plaintiffs.

And, Your Honor, just to illustrate, I'd like to hand up an excerpt from plaintiffs' complaint that I just took randomly. This is -- what I've handed up, Your Honor, is Pages 20 through, I believe, 25 of the Second Amended Complaint. And this is, this is a representative example of how the complaint is formatted vis-a-vis the specific allegations by each of the 72 plaintiffs.

And if you take the first one, and I apologize in advance because I'm sure I will butcher the pronunciation, but by Plaintiff Al-Majma'ae. Paragraph 105 says, "The plaintiff was tortured and otherwise mistreated by L-3 and its co-conspirators." Doesn't mention Mr. Nakhla. Paragraph 106, "The plaintiff was detained." Doesn't mention Mr. Nakhla. Paragraph 107, "The plaintiff was beaten." 108, "threatened with unleashed dogs." 109, "Threatened with burning his eyes with lit cigarettes." And I can go on and on, not only for this plaintiff, Your Honor, but for 70 of the other 72 plaintiffs, in none of their allegations mention Adel Nakhla.

The most basic function of a pleading is to let the defendant and the Court know what the plaintiffs think the
defendant did to them. And for these direct claims, this complaint fails that function.

Your Honor, this is such a basic, well-established principle, I don't think cases or authority is necessary to decide this question as to the direct claims for these 71 plaintiffs. But I direct Your Honor to Rule 8, which requires a short and plain statement of the nature of the claim and showing entitlement to relief.

I direct Your Honor to the Dixon case in the Fourth Circuit, which says the plaintiffs have to support facts in support of each element of their claim. And I'd like to direct Your Honor to the Major case, which is a relatively recent case decided by Judge Bates on the District Court in the District of Columbia where he makes the self-evident point that in a multi-defendant case, in a multi-plaintiff case, each plaintiff must include allegations of fact as to each defendant. And if they don't, the claims must by dismissed.

Now, implicit in what I'm saying, Your Honor, are the allegations of one plaintiff, Mr. Al-Quraishi who is the lead plaintiff. He does include fact allegations to support these substantive counts against Mr. Nakhla. The argument I'm making now does not pertain to those counts. We do not believe the allegations are susceptible to being proven and we believe we will disprove them, but we concede that will be for another day if the case were to proceed. But with regard to 71 other
plaintiffs, their direct claims must be dismissed.
Turning to my second argument, Your Honor. This relates to the conspiracy claim, and I would just like to take a step back. There are six counts in the complaint for conspiracy. As Your Honor noted, one for, that mirrors each substantive count.

Mr. Nakhla as stated in the complaints, by the complaints very allegations was in Iraq for approximately one year from, I believe, May or June of 2003 through May of 2004. He was -- he departed from Iraq by the terms of the complaint by May of 2004. He was at one facility, Abu Ghraib. And again, these are both in paragraph six of the complaint. One facility for approximately eleven months.

The conspiracy alleged in this complaint is a conspiracy that, number one, pertains to in excess of 20 other facilities throughout the entire country of Iraq that Mr. Nakhla never by the terms of the complaint, as well as in fact never went to and never worked at.

The conspiracy also extends for a period of time beyond when he left Iraq. And it extends for this period of time -- sorry I'm not being incredibly articulate here, but it extends from 2003 to 2008, a five-year period. At most, Mr. Nakhla was in Iraq for eleven of those months.

Now, if there's a properly pled conspiracy, that is appropriate. But this conspiracy is massive. Twenty facilities
throughout the country of Iraq spanning five years. And my client by the terms of the complaint only was at a small slice of the facilities for a small slice of the time. And the plaintiffs have a pleading burden at the outset before they can proceed on a claim where he can be held vicariously liable for the conduct of others to show that there is some factual basis to believe that my client, Mr. Nakhla, in fact joined the conspiracy as alleged, that vast and wide-ranging conspiracy.

THE COURT: Could he have joined a smaller conspiracy, though, at Abu Ghraib for the time he was there. Of course, there's some argument about whether he withdrew timely and so on. But leaving that aside, it's arguable that it could be scaled back to just a conspiracy involving just that particular site, couldn't it?

MR. DELINSKY: I think the plaintiffs would continue to have problems, but I think their task would be less momentous in that instance.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. DELINSKY: Your Honor, the key issue here goes to the key element of conspiracy, which is so well-settled. I won't harp on it, but there needs to be an agreement. That's the crime or that's the civil offense. There needs to be a conspiratorial agreement.

And this case is dictated by a Supreme Court decision handed down last year called the Twombly case. In Twombly, the
plaintiffs had asserted an anti-trust conspiracy. Yet, all they did was rather than setting forth facts to suggest the existence of an agreement, they just used the boilerplate terms. They said, the defendant's agreed, the defendants conspired, but there was no factual matter to support those very cursory and boilerplate allegations. And the Supreme Court ruled that that is insufficient as a matter of Rule 8 and as a matter of pleading.

The Supreme Court said that a complaint alleging a conspiracy has to have enough factual matter to suggest a conspiracy. That was the first prong in the holding. The second prong of Twombly was the Supreme Court said that parallel conduct is not enough. In other words, it's not enough to say that Mr. Zymelman engaged in Conduct A and Ms. Burke also engaged in Conduct A, because that just as well could be a coincidence.

THE COURT: It's a good argument for two separate lawsuits, isn't it?

MR. DELINSKY: It's a good argument for no conspiracy. THE COURT: Well, I'm going to ask Ms. Burke momentarily though whether the case survives if conspiracy counts go. That's what I want to hear answer to.

All right. Let me hear from her and you can rejoin.
MR. DELINSKY: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And answer that question first, Ms. Burke.

What happens if the conspiracy counts go to the suit?
MS. BURKE: Your Honor, it would still proceed with the, you know, with the actions of the L-3 employees, the direct actions against the victims.

THE COURT: You mean, the ATS actions?
MS. BURKE: Yes.
THE COURT: All right.
MS. BURKE: Yes. And if so, there's still direct liability as well as, you know, as well as vicarious.

A couple points first on the direct liability points that counsel made on behalf of his client. Although, I understand his point that he wants more information, we do think that his client has been put on notice. We did for each plaintiff say where they were and whether or not they overlapped in time with him, and those dates were put in to provide him with notice. Certainly, you know, if you think we need more specificity, we can add more.

THE COURT: Isn't the short of the matter though that 71 plaintiffs really don't know whether Mr. Nakhla was involved at all?

MS. BURKE: Well, actually, Mr. Nakhla because of his status, he was the primary translator for Charles Graner and he was in the hard site. So, unlike some the other wrongdoers, he's known by sight. They called him Abu Hamid. And he's known by sight, and they know what he did to them.

THE COURT: You mean, he's going to be identified as the perpetrator if this case goes forward.

MS. BURKE: He is one of the perpetrators, definitely. Yes, definitely. And so on the direct liability, the notice that we gave, we think he has been put on notice.

THE COURT: Does it cure the alleged deficiency in the pleading to say that on information and belief Mr. Nakhla was one of the people who you said beat them, beat plaintiff, threatened them with dogs, threatened burning their eyes.

MS. BURKE: Yes. And, Your Honor, we did, we did on the first plaintiff spell out with specificity the acts that were observed by Nakhla. Both things that were done directly to Mr. Al-Quraishi as well as things that were observed.

Because of the physical layout of the hard site, Your Honor, the victims not only knew what happened to them, but it was all done in front of them to other people. So we do have eyewitnesses to Abu Hamid, to Adel Nakhla's involvement in the various acts of torture.

Now, there are some who he's not, there is not the direct, because he was gone. So it's the subset of the Abu Ghraib victims that we have that information for.

THE COURT: What is your theory that he's liable for acts that occurred after his departure?

MS. BURKE: Well, that really goes to the conspiracy allegation, is to whether once you have joined, once you have
voluntarily joined in a conspiracy to torture detainees, whether you can evade liability for what happens once you physically leave. And that turns on the case law on withdrawal, conspiratorial -- you know, members of conspiracy, whether or not they can withdraw.

If Mr. Nakhla had come back to the United States, raised the alarm, went to the authorities, he may have an argument that he shouldn't be held liable for what happened after he left. But that's not what happened. You know, he lied to the authorities. He continues to insist that he didn't participate. He has made no -- he's never stated, okay, I'm withdrawing from the conspiracy.

So, we think it's an issue of conspiracy law that he has continued vicarious liability for the acts of the others. And, you know, if you think about the nature of this case, it's not like the case in Twombly. You know, there Mr. Delinsky's point that, okay, we don't have enough evidence of agreement.

Well, in Twombly, the conduct at issue, the parallel conduct at issue was lawful conduct. So it was susceptible to, you know, two different interpretations. Here, you know, the parallel conduct, what we've alleged is that, you know, he held down a boy while another conspirator placed a toothbrush in his anus. The conduct is that he held Mr. Al-Quraishi down while another conspirator poured feces on him.

You know, so it's not, the type of conduct we're
alleging, his participation in it with others is an allegation of the agreement, because you don't accidently do that. You have to be -- they joined together to hurt people.

So I don't think -- you know, I understand Mr.
Delinsky's pleading points, but I don't think they are
well-taken when you read Twombly. The parallel conduct here is not susceptible to a lawful interpretation.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Delinsky.
MR. DELINSKY: Thank you, Your Honor.

If other plaintiffs have something to say about my client, Mr. Nakhla, that's fine, but it should be put in a pleading. It is not sufficient for counsel to stand up in open court and simply say so. It should be put in a pleading and we should have the opportunity to, number one, see the allegations; and number two, to test them in any way that's appropriate.

As we sit here today, 71 of the plaintiffs don't say nothing about Adel Nakhla. They don't identify any conduct that he perpetrated on to them apart from this vast conspiracy. Those direct claims by those 71 plaintiffs against my client must be dismissed.

Now, Your Honor, I'd like to make just one final point about that. In Virginia, in the first round of litigation where we represented Mr. Nakhla and the same counsel in behalf of plaintiffs represented the class, we raised this very same argument. When the case was transferred to D.C., we raised the
very same argument. This is not new. This is basic Rule 8.
A First Amended Complaint was filed in this case in
the fall. Plaintiffs then moved to amend. Part of their reason for amending was they wanted to add more specificity, and we now find ourselves with the Second Amended Complaint that with regard to Mr. Nakhla doesn't haven't specificity.

Plaintiffs have been on notice that this was required, and I don't believe they can supplement or amend in a way to add allegations against Mr. Nakhla, but they should not be permitted that opportunity. Enough is enough at this point. These arguments are old. They've been on notice of them for years.

THE COURT: Has there been any discovery at any point?
MR. DELINSKY: No, Your Honor, because Mr. Nakhla was dismissed so quickly from the other suits.

Now, Your Honor, briefly turning to the conspiracy issue. I would simply direct Your Honor to the Twombly case. THE COURT: I'm familiar with Twombly.

MR. DELINSKY: And I would also direct Your Honor to Ruttenberg case, which is a case out of the Fourth Circuit included in what I have given you. And the reason I direct you to this case is as follows. That was a case involving civil rights violations. And when it came to the conspiracy under Section 1985 to commit civil rights violations, the Fourth Circuit adopted in full Twombly. It did not bind to the distinction made by plaintiff's counsel that Twombly in its
pleading rules only applied to instances where the conduct is innocent but for the conspiracy, because in that case there were civil rights violations that were violative of statute. Yet, the Court still said, parallel conduct alone is not enough. You need facts to show that there was an agreement.

Now, Your Honor, in that regard I'd like to end on the following note and that is Your Honor's opinion in Lazarbe. Again, $I$ hope I'm pronouncing it right, because Your Honor did address a joint criminal enterprise claim in that case and did sustain it.

Lazarbe, especially when you study the complaint, though, as well as Your Honor's opinion contains the exactly kind of conspiracy, allegations of fact that is needed in order to sustain a claim. In Lazarbe there was allegations of a meeting involving Defendant Rondon, as well as his commanders and his co-lieutenants. In Lazarbe there were allegations. It was a much more discreet conspiracy. As Your Honor knows, there were allegations that he played a critical role in the totality of the conspiracy by blockading roads.

So particularly with regard to the meeting allegation, there was a meet to that conspiracy allegation that is completely lacking in this complaint. This is a vast conspiracy.

My client was a civilian translator and he is alleged to have joined a conspiracy spanning 20 facilities he's never
seen, and spanning four years beyond the time he left the country. Yet, there's no allegations to support the fact that he ever agreed to that, that he joined it, that there was a meeting, who he met with, what was said, or even what the common object was. The only allegation is that the common object was to engage in a series of illegal acts, and that's just not enough.

So, Your Honor, this complaint is just void of the kind of basic allegations of fact that not only Twombly requires, but a long line of Fourth Circuit law requires. And I handed them up to you, Your Honor; Dixon, Bass, as well as Ruttenberg.

Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Ms. Burke, final.
MS. BURKE: Just very briefly, Your Honor. I want to respond to one point by Mr. Delinsky about there not being any discovery yet. Because of the proceedings in the other cases, we have been given some documents from the, from the government itself. And included in those are statements from the co-conspirators, from Graner and from Frederick. So there's certainly basis for the allegations that we are making about his client.

And I think that when you look at this complaint and you look at the allegations we made about his role and his participation, and what he was willing to do and go along with,
that we do meet the level set forth to allege the conspiracy.
THE COURT: Before you sit down, give me some idea of how you say L-3 conspired. I know you identified Nakhla and you're saying that there are some individuals who did this. What did the corporation do exactly? What's your theory of their liability?

MS. BURKE: Well, yes. For example, we have testimony from a middle manager at $L-3$, and he learned from one $\mathrm{L}-3$ translator that another L-3 translator had been abusing a prisoner. He reported it up and the response from management was, well, let's hope the military doesn't report it. Let's hope they're on our team. So we have evidence of L-3's --

THE COURT: What sort of torture do you say was reported?

MS. BURKE: On that particular one, those I believe were beatings of, those were beatings.

THE COURT: All right. What else? Anything else?
MS. BURKE: Well, it's a similar, it's similar genre. You know, it's other L-3 employees who had participated with the one, with the -- the torture that's best known, the facts and circumstances that we know the best are the Abu Ghraib hard site, because of the Taguba report and the government investigation. So we have a more fulsome picture of what L-3 did there.

And L-3's own executives have testified that they took
no steps, they took no steps whatsoever. That their view was, you know, we'll just turn our translators over. If they abuse people, they abuse people. We're not going to stop them.

THE COURT: So your alternative theory is that they weren't paying attention as opposed to making a concerted decision to torture?

MS. BURKE: Yes, Your Honor, although because of the span of time, you know, not paying attention may be how you would describe it in year one. When you get to year four, year five, I think you're getting into an agreement.

If they wanted to stop it, they could have. And the length of time that it went on and their continued willing participation, as Judge Weinstein teaches in the Agent Orange case, if a corporate actor is put in a situation of having to do an illegal act or walking away, they're always free to walk away and lose their corporate profits.

So here, you know, L-3 has continued participation in this on-going conduct. I think it goes far beyond not doing anything about it. They had to -- they sought out and continued to reap the financial rewards of being willing to send their people over to participate in hurting others.

THE COURT: So, your, your theory, at least, is that there's a study stream of reports of abuse that they are not acting on or they're concealing?

MS. BURKE: Well, concealing as well, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Is that the way it's alleged in your complaint?

MS. BURKE: Yes, Your Honor. I think if you look in the back when we talk about L-3's conduct, we allege that they tried to cover it up. And that they, that they willfully -Paragraph 425, "Knowingly and willfully permitted scores of its employees to participate in the torturing and --

THE COURT: Slow down a bit, slow down.
MS. BURKE: I'm sorry.
"Knowingly and willfully permitted scores of its employees to participate in torturing and abusing prisoners over an extended period of time throughout Iraq."

And then we talked about how there's been admissions under oath, and how L-3 continued to permit its translators to participate. That they failed to take any effective action to prevent its employees from making threats, abusing and torturing prisoners.

And then Paragraph 432 alleges, L-3 willfully failed to report L-3 employee's repeated assaults and other criminal conduct by its employees to the United States or Iraqi employees.

Paragraph 433 alleges, L-3 affirmatively hid the misconduct of its employees from the United States military.

Paragraph 434, L-3 discouraged its employees from reporting prisoner abuse to the United States authorities.

And then we go on to talk about the fact that L-3 participated in the various locations.

THE COURT: All right. Final word.
MR. ZYMELMAN: Since L-3 has -- the question about specific allegations against $L-3$, Your Honor, as we set forth in our brief, the allegations are in paragraphs 4 -- principally in Paragraphs 424 and 425. And none of the paragraphs have been read. They're all sort of arguments as to why you might want to hold -- why plaintiffs think that $\mathrm{L}-3$ is liable for the acts of its employees. Obviously, L-3 can't conspire with its own employees. The conspiracy is allegedly between $\mathrm{L}-3$ and the military, and CACI. And there are no allegations about the agreement that, between those three other than they agreed. And all the issues that Mr. Delinsky raised with regard to Mr. Nakhla apply equally with regard to L-3. There are no allegations here of how L-3 conspired and agreed with the military and CACI. The suggestion that one of the managers said, well, we hope they're on our team suggests exactly the opposite. If there were an agreement, there wouldn't need to be any kind of hope.

THE COURT: Well, how do account for the individuals like Graner and so on who were supposedly military who committed these acts?

MR. ZYMELMAN: And none of them testified that there was a conspiracy. None of them testified that there was a
generalized agreement. They testified to what they did and that, who was present and not. And most of the statements relied upon are not sworn statements anyway. And none of that is in the complaint.

If there are specific allegations to be found from Mr. Graner's statement or the other military, convicted personnel statements, then to describe the, how this conspiracy arose and what the common purpose was, when there was a meeting with the specificity that was in the Lazarbe complaint, that there was a meeting where all this was discussed, it doesn't exists.

We are entitled to have those types of allegations subject to Rule 11 put forward. If they are in all these other documents, it shouldn't be that big a deal. This case has been proceeding along for some time. As Mr. Delinsky pointed, this is now, we're now on the Second Amended Complaint.

This issue of the adequacy of the conspiracy allegations, the fact that at this point since conspiracy is such an important linchpin of so many of these claims, to say that it comes down to the allegation in Paragraph 424 of $\mathrm{L}-3$ also participated in the conspiracy to torture prisoners; L-3 verbally expressed its intent to join the conspiracy by making a series of statements to military personnel and others. L-3's actions evidenced an intent to join the conspiracy as the company knowingly and willfully permitted scores of its employees to participate in torturing and abusing prisoners over
an extended period of time throughout Iraq. That's not enough, Your Honor, under Twombly, under Ruttenberg, under all the cases.

THE COURT: I don't know, I don't know. I can't say
that I've totally digested every specific of the allegation, but certainly there is a suggestion that at the highest levels of the Department of Defense there was indication that certain techniques that could be employed that some people would call torture, and that this was really a play-out of that sort of, that sort of direct, if you will.

Now, is that -- I don't know whether that's in the complaint, but assuming that it were, would that be enough to at least get you by the pleading stage.

MR. ZYMELMAN: In terms of the conspiracy --
THE COURT: Well, I mean, one talks commonly about
water boarding, and I don't know whether that's one of the things that's claimed in this case. It may well be. MS. BURKE: Not this particular case. MR. ZYMELMAN: It's not, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. MR. ZYMELMAN: But, Your Honor, obviously, that kind of allegation, with or without it, we think would obviously walk straight into the Political Question Doctrine and the other jurisprudential issues. However, even on the basis -THE COURT: Well, it might not if it was -- if there's
no derivative immunity.
MR. ZYMELMAN: No, Your Honor, we believe that what we're talking about is a policy from the highest levels of the executive. Whether it's derivative or not, it would clearly touch on how the military at that point chose to conduct the war.

THE COURT: Well, when it comes to conspiracy, you're saying, I think in effect, it's impossible to conspire with the military because every military decision is effectively a political question decision.

MR. ZYMELMAN: No, Your Honor, I mean, not every conspiracy with the military is necessarily a political question. I submit, Your Honor, that a conspiracy with the military and how it conducts the war is a political question, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, when could you have a conspiracy with the military that was not subject to the Political Question Doctrine?

MR. ZYMELMAN: The military engages in all sorts of conduct and all sorts of issues. How the military runs a PX, for example, on its bases. The military conducts all sorts of activities that aren't the conduct necessarily of the prosecution of a war. During peace time, how the military puts, you know, gas stations and what prices to charge. I mean, Your Honor, I don't have a specific case in mind, Your Honor. I'm
dealing with a sort of unstated hypothetical, but it's not the case that simply because conspiring with the military to conduct military policy during war time would walk you squarely into the Political Question Doctrine doesn't mean you could never have that kind of conspiracy.

But again, if you have a specific hypothetical, Your Honor, I'm happy to try to analyze that, but obviously there are many activities the military --

THE COURT: Well, torture is a specific example, I guess. I mean, when is it proper to, when it is proper to hold a boy down and rape him? When is that proper?

MR. ZYMELMAN: Proper in the sense of is it the proper
$\qquad$
THE COURT: Is that blocked by the Political Doctrine?
MR. ZYMELMAN: Yes, Your Honor. Under these circumstances where the allegation, if true -- again, we're assuming the truth of these allegations. But if we're assuming the truth of these allegations, then the proper venue for that is through prosecutions, through compensation from the sovereign. But if the allegation is that this was done in the course of detention and interrogation operations in a military prison during a time of war and occupation, then, yes, Your Honor, there is no civil claim for that.

THE COURT: All right. Let me hear from you, Ms. Burke, on that.

MS. BURKE: Your Honor, in fact that question is exactly the point. You know, this conduct that is alleged is not a U.S. military policy. It's illegal conduct. And even this notion that the defendants have argued, well, if you want any type of civil compensation, you have to go to the United States is belied by the United States own army regulations. Army Regulation 27-20, and I'll bring up a copy to Your Honor, said that if there's a third-party claim involving an independent contractor, the military is not going to handle that. It gets bumped to the independent contractor and their insurance carrier.

So, you know, clearly this company conspired with wrongdoing military actors. The fact that they conspired with the military does not turn it into a political question. This is conduct that is illegal under the laws of the United States. It's illegal under international law. It's illegal under Iraq law. So there's no way that they can escape any kind of liability for a voluntary and willing participation in a series of criminal acts in order to make more money.

THE COURT: You want to hand that document up?
All right. Is there anything else we haven't talked about this afternoon? Pretty much exhausted it?

MR. ZYMELMAN: Your Honor, just one clarification. I want to be clear that, obviously, I was addressing the sufficiency of the conspiracy allegation and whether it was as
you hypothesized, if there was, this was a direction from the highest levels of the military department to engage in this conduct, that it would walk you squarely into the political question.

We believe with or without the conspiracy allegation, for all sorts of other reasons that we've discussed here today and in our papers that you are walking straight into a political question. I just want to be clear that we weren't narrowly defining it as assuming a conspiracy --

THE COURT: No, I understand that. The question I asked really of plaintiffs was whether if the conspiracy counts go out, what remains? They said, there's still the direct causes of action.

MR. ZYMELMAN: Well, again, assuming we -- on all the other issues, obviously, Your Honor, if there are particular -assuming they survive Political Question, Derivative Immunity, Law of War and whether there are, in fact, ATS claims, under those circumstance, then to extent that there are state law claims that particular plaintiffs against particular individuals, I mean, those would proceed until we get to the next stage would obviously be the preemption argument. THE COURT: Yes, I understand. All right. Anything further? MR. DELINSKY: Your Honor, if I could just make one last point.

The entire tenure of the conversation in the last five minutes, I think, underscores from the perspective of an individual the importance of dismissing the direct claims as well as the conspiracy claims of the 71 plaintiffs who say nothing about Mr. Nakhla.

These are inflammatory allegations that garner media attention, that have had the effect of impacting my client's reputation. And if a party is to come into a court and assert these claims, they must put my client on the most basic notice of what they're saying he did. And right now, only one the claimants has.

THE COURT: I understand.
All right. Anything else?
Well, I'll take this under advisement and write an
opinion. We'll see who wins the race between me and Judge Lee to get something written.

Thank you very much.
(Recess at 4:40 p.m.)
CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER
I, Linda C. Marshall, certify that the foregoing is a
correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the
above-entitled matter.
/s/

Linda C. Marshall, RPR Official Court Reporter

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